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Abstract
Malware has evolved over the past decades adding novel propagation vectors,
robust resilience techniques as well as diverse and increasingly advanced at-
tack strategies. The latest incarnation of malware is the notorious bot mal-
ware that provide the attacker with the ability to remotely control compro-
mised machines thus making them a part of networks of compromised ma-
chines also known as botnets. Bot malware rely on the Internet for propa-
gation, communicating with the remote attacker and implementing diverse
malicious activities. As network trafﬁc activity is one of the main traits of
malware and botnet operation, trafﬁc analysis is often seen as one of the key
means of identifying compromised machines within the network.
This thesis explores how can network trafﬁc analysis be used for accurate
and efﬁcient detection of malware network activities. The thesis focuses on
botnet detection by exploring the possibilities of developing a novel collabo-
rative approach to botnet protection that would utilize insights from various
detection sensors. Furthermore, we focus on network-based detection as-
pects of the collaborative framework by devising novel detection approaches
that are aimed at identifying malware network activity at different points
in the network and based on different, mutually complementary, principles
of trafﬁc analysis. The detection approaches proposed by the thesis rely on
machine learning algorithms (MLAs) for identifying malicious trafﬁc as a set
of algorithms capable of identifying patterns of malicious network trafﬁc in
automated and resource-efﬁcient manner. The proposed approaches are de-
veloped in order to cover different aspects of malware network activity and
thus be suitable candidates for a future collaborative botnet protection sys-
tem. We evaluated the proposed detection methods through extensive set
of experiments in order to assess the capabilities of different trafﬁc analysis
scenarios and machine learning algorithms to facilitate accurate and time-
efﬁcient detection. The experimental evaluation was performed using ma-
licious and benign trafﬁc traces originating from honeypots and malware
testing environments as well as trafﬁc traces from large-scale ISP networks.
Based on the evaluation, the proposed trafﬁc analysis methods promise ac-
curate and efﬁcient identiﬁcation of malicious network trafﬁc, thus being
iii
promising candidates for future operational deployment. Furthermore, in
addition to novel machine learning-based detection approaches the thesis
provides an overview of some of the biggest challenges of using MLAs for
identifying malicious network activities. The challenge specially addressed
by the thesis is the “ground truth” problem, where we proposed a novel label-
ing approach for obtaining the ground truth on agile DNS trafﬁc. The novel
labeling approach has proved to provide reliable and time-efﬁcient labeling
by discovering much wider set of malicious domain names in comparison to
conventional labeling solutions. Finally, the thesis outlines the opportunities
for future work on realizing more robust and effective detection solutions.
Resumé
Malware har udviklet sig gennem de sidste årtier med nye spredningsvek-
torer, robuste teknikker til at modstå bekæmpelse, samt alsidige og stadigt
mere avancerede angrebsstrategier. De sidste generationer af malware er de
notoriske bot malware, der giver angriberen mulighed for at fjernstyre an-
grebne maskiner, og således gøre dem til en del af et netværk af inﬁcerede
maskiner, såkaldte botnet. Bot malware bruger Internettet til spredning, kom-
munikation med angriberen, og endeligt til at implementere diverse ondart-
ede aktiviteter. Den netværkstraﬁk der genereres i forbindelse med disse
aktiviteter udgør et væsentligt træk, og bliver af mange set som et af de
vigtigste redskaber til at identiﬁcere inﬁcerede maskiner på et netværk.
Denne afhandling undersøger hvordan netværkstraﬁkanalyse kan bruges
til præcis og effektiv detektion af ondsindede netværksaktiviteter. Afhandlin-
gen fokuserer på detektion af botnets ved at udforske mulighederne for at
udvikle en ny kollaborativ tilgang der gør brug af informationer fra forskel-
lige typer af sensorer. Derudover fokuseres der på de netværksbaserede as-
pekter ved at udvikle nye metoder til detektion med henblik på at identiﬁ-
cere ondsindet netværksaktivitet I forskellige punkter på netværket. Disse
er baseret på forskellige tilgange til traﬁkanalyse, der gensidigt supplerer hi-
nanden. Metoderne til detektion der foreslås i afhandlingen baserer sig på
maskinlæringsalgoritmer (MLA) til at identiﬁcere ondsindet traﬁk, og imple-
menteres ved hjælpe af en række algoritmer der er i stand til at identiﬁcere
mønstre af ondsindet traﬁk på en automatiseret og ressource-effektiv måde.
De foreslåede tilgange er udviklet med henblik på at afdække forskellige as-
pekter af ondsindet netværksaktivitet, og dermed være egnede kandidater
til at indgå i et fremtidigt kollaborativt system til beskyttelse mod botnets.
Vi har analyseret og evalueret de foreslåede detektionsmetoder gennem om-
fattende eksperimenter med henblik på at undersøge hvordan de maskin-
læringsalgoritmer og forskellige scenarier til traﬁkanalyse kan understøtte
præcis og hurtig detektion. Den eksperimentelle evaluering blev udført ved
hjælp af både reel og ondsindet netværkstraﬁk, opsamlet ved hjælp af såvel
honeypots og testmiljøer for malware som større ISP-netværk. Ud fra eval-
ueringerne blev det konkluderet at de foreslåede metoder til traﬁkanalyse
v
er lovende i forhold til at kunne bruges til præcis og effektiv identiﬁkation
af ondsindet netværkstraﬁk, og dermed også lovende i forhold til at kunne
anvendes i operationelle miljøer I fremtiden. Udover nye maskinlærings-
baserede tilgange til detektion giver afhandlingen et overblik over nogle af de
største udfordringer ved at bruge MLA til at identiﬁcere ondsindet netværk-
saktivitet. Især behandles “ground truth” udfordringen, og i forbindelse
hermed foreslås en ny fremgangsmåde til at ﬁnde og mærke traﬁk baseret på
agil DNS-traﬁk. Det viser sig at denne nye tilgang giver både pålidelig og tid-
seffektiv mærkning idet den opdager langt ﬂere ondsindede domænenavne
end konventionelle mærkningsmetoder. Afslutningsvis kommer afhandlin-
gen med et overblik over muligheder for fremtidigt arbejde på vej mod mere
robuste og effektive detektionsløsninger.
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Introduction
The growing reliance on the Internet, the advances in computing technology
and the proliferation of affordable computing units have contributed to a
new “connected” era of human civilization. However, the new connected
world introduces numerous challenges to the protection of the privacy and
the security of users and user’s data.
During the last two decades, the use of the Internet and Internet-based
applications has experienced a tremendous expansion to the point at which
they have become an integral part of our lives, supporting a wide range of
services, such as banking, commerce, healthcare, public administration and
education. The number of the Internet users worldwide have surpassed 3
billion in 2015 corresponding to the penetration rate of over 40% [1]. Fur-
thermore, the technology advances have led to the proliferation of affordable
computing units in forms of either conventional personal computers or hand-
held devices such as smartphones and tablets. Figures for 2014 show over 2.6
billion smartphone subscriptions globally with a steady growth trends [2].
Finally, Internet of Things (IoT) together with initiatives such as Smart Grids
and Smart Cities have contributed to networking of even wider set of house-
hold appliances equipping them with often capable computing units and net-
working ability via multiple communication technologies. The latest reports
claim that the number of IoT devices in 2015 was 13.4 billion corresponding
to over 2 Internet connected units on average per person in the world [3].
Although offering a number of advantages, the new connected world rep-
resents an attractive playing ﬁeld for cyber criminals. Criminals rely on In-
ternet for implementing various illegal activities in anonymous and hardly
traceable manner. As over 40% of world’s population uses the Internet the
reach of potential attacks is immense. Furthermore, a large number of con-
nected computational units represents a great asset in terms of both the cu-
mulative computational power and the available network bandwidth. Attack-
ers often try to compromise these machines and use them in diverse mali-
cious contexts ranging from mining of digital currencies to launching power-
ful Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Cyber criminals rely on ma-
licious software also known as malware for misusing the Internet connected
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computers. Modern malware relies on Internet for implementing its mali-
cious agenda and facilitating communication infrastructure through which
attackers can control compromised computers.
This thesis tackles the malware detection problem from the perspective
of network trafﬁc analysis. The work presented in this thesis proposes novel
methods that aim at providing efﬁcient and accurate malware detection based
on network trafﬁc analysis. The thesis focuses on botnets as networks of com-
puters compromised with malware. We have devised several trafﬁc analysis
strategies aimed at identifying botnets at different points in the network and
based on different, mutually complementary, principles of trafﬁc analysis.
The proposed approaches are developed in order to cover different aspects
of malware network activity and thus be suitable candidates for a future col-
laborative botnet protection system. For the realization of the trafﬁc analysis
we rely on Machine Learning Algorithms (MLAs) as a set of algorithms ca-
pable of identifying the patterns of malicious network trafﬁc in automated
and resource-efﬁcient manner. Furthermore, the thesis brings an overview of
both capabilities and some of the biggest challenges of using MLAs for iden-
tifying botnets, such as the “ground truth” problem. The proposed methods
have been evaluated using trafﬁc traces captured by honeypots and malware
testing environments as well as traces from ISP networks. As a result, the
proposed detection methods promise accurate and efﬁcient identiﬁcation of
malicious network trafﬁc, thus being good candidates for the use in a future
collaborative botnet protection systems.
This chapter has a goal of outlining the work done during the PhD project
and summarizing its contributions. The chapter is based on ﬁndings and
conclusions of our technical report on the use of machine learning for bot-
net detection [4]. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 presents
malware threat in more details by elaborating on the malware phenomena,
current trends and characteristics of modern malware. The section focuses
on botnets as the latest malware incarnation. Section 2 presents the main
motivation for network-based detection of malware and overall concepts be-
hind it. This section emphasizes machine learning-based approaches as one
of the most promising classes of detection methods. Section 3 deﬁnes the
problem statement addressed by the thesis and four research questions cov-
ered by the work done. The four research questions cover some of the most
prominent topics in the ﬁeld of network-based malware detection. Section 4
presents the state of the art on network-based malware detection focusing
on machine-learning based approaches. This section also outlines opportu-
nities for future work out of which several have been the focus of the work
presented in the attached papers. Section 5 presents the main contributions
of the thesis and appended paper. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the conclu-
sions of the thesis. This section also discusses our ﬁndings and outlines the
opportunities for future work.
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1. Malware Threat
1 Malware Threat
In this section we present the treat of malware by presenting characteristics of
modern malware and the current trends. Furthermore, we focus on botnets
as one of the latest malware incarnations.
Malware represents the main carrier of malicious activities on the Inter-
net. Malware implements a variety of malicious and illegal activities that
disrupt the use of compromised computers and jeopardize the security of the
end users. In parallel with the development and expansion of Internet-based
services, malware has evolved by improving the mechanisms of propagation,
malicious activities, and resilience to take down efforts. Modern malware
targets a variety of client platforms, compromising millions of computers
worldwide, deploying sophisticated attack campaigns and causing great ﬁ-
nancial damages to both industry and governments.
Modern malware covers a variety of platforms from mobile operating sys-
tems [5] to industrial control systems [6]. Although often perceived as a prob-
lem exclusively tied to Windows platform malware has spread out to other
operating system as well such as Apple Mac OS and Linux [7]. One of the
latest trends is the shift towards mobile operating systems due to the popu-
larity of smartphones and their use for different services such as e-banking,
online shopping, etc. Symantec reports that over 1 million distinct mobile
malware samples were observed in 2014 where the majority of them were
targeting Android operating system [8].
Estimations of the number of novel malware indicate that in 2015 over
390,000 new malware samples were observed daily [9]. Furthermore, the
number of new malware variants has seen increase of 26% in 2014 reporting
staggering 317 million of new malware variants [8]. The number of infected
machines worldwide has been increasing over the last 10 years with the latest
estimation from 2014 that indicates that 14% of all residential and 0.68% of
mobile Internet users are compromised with some kind of malware [10].
Malware is used to implement a variety of malicious activities such as
sending SPAM messages, deploying DDoS attacks, information theft, mining
digital currencies, ransomware, etc. All of this activities cause a signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial damage to individuals, companies and governments. Some reports
estimate that the annual global cyber-crime costs are more than 300 billion
US dollars [11]. The majority of these costs is directly or indirectly related to
malware. Furthermore, the recent study by Ponemon Institute outlines the
cost of malware containment commercial companies are faced with [12]. The
report indicates the great ﬁnancial expenses of effectively protecting company
infrastructure from malware threat.
Based on the presented, malware is rightfully regarded as one of the
biggest cyber security threats today. As such malware requires efﬁcient and
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effective neutralization techniques. Malware detection represents a key ele-
ment of any successful neutralization techniques. In the following we put
more light on botnets as the latest incarnation of malware and opportunities
for their detection.
1.1 Botnets - the connected malware
One of the most capable types of malware is the notorious bot malware. Bot
malware represents a program that allows the creator to control infected com-
puters remotely. This class of malware is commonly considered as one of the
most advanced malware classes as it incorporates sophisticated propagation,
resilience and attack techniques used by other malware classes [13, 14]. The
main advantage in comparison to other malware types and the main trait of
bot malware is the ability to facilitate remote control of compromised clients
by an attacker through a specially deployed Command and Control (C&C) com-
munication channel [15–17]. Once loaded onto a client machine the bot mal-
ware compromises the vulnerable machine and, using the C&C channel, puts
it under the remote control by the attacker. The attacker is popularly referred
to as the botmaster, while compromised hosts are known as bots. Using a de-
ployed C&C channel the botmaster can remotely control the behavior of bots
and transfer the data to and from the compromised machine. This way the
attacker can make the operation of bots more ﬂexible and consequently more
effective in implementing their malicious agenda.
A botnet is a usually large collection of computers that are infected with
the speciﬁc bot malware. Controlled and coordinated by the botmaster, bot-
nets represent a collaborative and highly distributed platform for the imple-
mentation of a wide range of malicious and illegal activities. Botnets may
range in size from a couple of hundred to several million bots [18, 19]. In
addition, botnets can span over home, corporate and educational networks,
while covering numerous autonomous systems operated by different Inter-
net Service Providers (ISPs). Since botnets include such a large number of
bots, they often have enormous bandwidth and computational power at their
disposal. Furthermore, botnets are capable of implementing diverse mali-
cious activities such as: information theft, spam distribution, DDoS attacks,
malware distribution, click fraud, mining digital currencies, etc.
Botnet threat - real-world examples
The threat of botnets is best illustrated by the examples of botnets observed
in the wild over the past decade. Some of the most notorious botnets ever
encountered [20] are:
Storm - Storm botnet was one of the ﬁrst wide-scale botnets captured in
the wild. The Storm botnet was ﬁrst detected in 2007 and it is notable
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for being one of the ﬁrst peer-to-peer botnets. Estimates of Storm’s size
ranged anywhere from 250,000 to 50 million compromised computers.
This botnet was known for enabling share price fraud and identity theft
but portions of it were often leased for other malicious activities as well.
Storm was partially shut down in 2008.
Conﬁcker - Conﬁcker represents one of the widest spread malware of the
last decade. At its peak in 2009, the Conﬁcker worm have infected 15
million computers, but the total number of machines under its botnet
control was between 3 and 4 million. This makes the Conﬁcker one of
the largest botnets ever.
Cutwail - Cutwail represent one of the biggest spam botnets to date. At
its peak in 2009 the botnet controlled up to 2 million compromised
computers, sending 74 billion spam emails per day which is equivalent
to nearly a million e-mails per minute. This made up 46.5% of the global
spam volume at the time. In 2010, two-thirds of Cutwails’s control
servers were disabled.
ZeroAccess - ZeroAccess botnet is one of the more recent botnets to be de-
tected. The size estimates indicate that it was controlling over 1.9 mil-
lion compromised computers around the world. This botnet is known
for implementing click fraud and bitcoin mining. Due to the latter, this
botnet was reported to be consuming enough energy to power 111,000
homes every single day from all its infected computers.
Windigo - Windigo botnet was discovered in 2014 after operating unde-
tected for three years. In this time, it had infected 10,000 Linux servers
enabling it to send 35 million spam emails a day. The threat posed by
Windigo is ongoing and as more than 60% of all web servers use Linux
servers the potential risk is huge.
Botnet operational life-cycle
Botnet operation can be described through the analysis of botnet life-cycle i.e.
the set of botnet operational phases [14, 21]. The botnet life-cycle is com-
monly generalized as consisting of three distinct phases: the infection phase,
the C&C communication phase and the attack phase.
The infection phase is the ﬁrst phase of the botnet life-cycle in which
vulnerable computers are compromised with bot malware, thus becoming
a member of a speciﬁc botnet. This phase is commonly divided into two
sub-phases i.e. initial infection and secondary infection. During the initial
infection sub-phase computers are infected with a malicious piece of soft-
ware also known as the “dropper”. The initial infection can be realized in
different ways, for instance, through the unwanted download of malware
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from malicious websites, through the download of infected ﬁles attached to
email messages, by propagation of malware from infected removable disks,
etc. The dropper assists in obtaining the bot malware binary. Upon suc-
cessful initial infection, the dropper downloads the malware binary over the
network and installs it on the vulnerable machine as a part of the secondary
infection sub-phase. Bot malware binaries can be downloaded using diverse
communication protocols, such as FTP (File Transfer Protocol), HTTP/HTTPS
(Hypertext Transfer Protocol) or P2P (Peer-to-Peer) protocols.
The second phase of the life-cycle is the C&C communication phase that
covers communication between compromised computers and malicious net-
work infrastructure. This phase covers several communication actions such
as: initial connection attempts to the C&C infrastructure upon successful
infection phase, connection attempts by the bot after reboot of the compro-
mised machine, periodical connection attempts in order to report the status of
the infected machine and the connection attempts initiated by the attacker in
order to update malware code or propagate instructions to bots. The commu-
nication channel established between bots and C&C servers i.e. C&C channel
can be implemented in different ways.
The third phase of botnet life-cycle is the attack phase that includes bot
operation aimed at implementing attackers’ malicious agenda. This phase in-
cludes malicious and illegal activities outlined above but also malware prop-
agation mechanism such as scanning for vulnerable computers. The second
and the third phase are functionally linked so they are usually altering one
after another, once a vulnerable computer is successfully infected.
Infection vectors
Modern malware relies on a number of infection vectors i.e. methods used by
the perpetrators for propagating the malware to other machines or networks
within the initial infection operational phase. Initial infection is realized us-
ing a variety of infection vectors, such as:
• Trojan horse - represent a propagation method in which the user is
tricked into installing the malicious software without understanding its
true nature.
• Network scanning - represents a common method to exploit vulnerable
network services of client machines. If client machines provide a vul-
nerable service over the network, it can be used by an attacker to attack
the system by network scanning for vulnerabilities.
• Drive-by-download - represents a method that targets user’s web
browser by exploiting vulnerabilities in the browser or browser plug-
ins. In this case malware is able to fetch code from the malicious web
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sites using connections which was initiated by the user himself and then
execute it on the victim’s machine.
The outlined infection vectors heavily rely on social engineering in order
to lure the user into performing a set of actions that could lead to successful
infection. Usually, a user is targeted through spam e-mails or social network
campaigns that commonly involve clicking on URLs, downloading malicious
ﬁles and in some cases installing malicious programs. In order to achieve
this, attackers often misuse governmental institutions’ or companies’ insignia
thus trying to recreate look and feel of legitimate e-mails and web pages. Fi-
nally, human impact should not be forgotten, as in many cases it is crucial
for successful infection. Human impact commonly reefers to the susceptibil-
ity to social engineering and phishing scams as well as the lack of security
awareness and knowledge about sound security practices.
C&C communication
The C&C channel is one of the deﬁning traits of bot malware and the main
carrier of botnet functionality. The C&C channel facilitates remote coordina-
tion of compromised computers, and introduces a level of ﬂexibility in botnet
operations by offering the ability to change and update malicious code. At-
tackers rely on several control mechanisms in terms of communication proto-
col and network architecture for deploying the C&C channel [15–17, 22–24].
Based on the topology of the C&C network, botnets are commonly classiﬁed
as centralized, decentralized and hybrid botnets.
Centralized botnets have centralized C&C network architecture, where
bots contact one or several C&C servers owned by the botmaster. Central-
ized C&C channels are commonly realized using IRC (Internet Relay Chat)
and HTTP/HTTPS protocols. IRC-based botnets are created by deploying
IRC servers or by using IRC servers in public IRC networks. In this case, the
botmaster speciﬁes a chat channel on a IRC server to which bots connect to
in order to receive commands. HTTP-based botnets rely on HTTP/HTTPS
protocols to transfer C&C messages. In contrast to IRC-based botnets, bots
in HTTP-based botnets contact a web-based C&C server notifying their ex-
istence with system-identifying information via HTTP/HTTPS requests. As
a response, the malicious server sends back commands or updates via coun-
terpart response messages. IRC- and HTTP-based botnets are characterized
with low latency of command messages and they are easy to deploy and
manage. For this reason, they have been widely used. However, the main
drawback of centralized botnets is that they are vulnerable take down due to
the single point of failure. That is, once the C&C servers have been identiﬁed
and disabled, the entire botnet could be taken down.
Decentralized botnets represent a class of botnets developed with the goal
of being more resilient to take down efforts. Botnets with decentralized C&C
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infrastructure have adopted P2P communication protocols as the mean of
communicating within a botnet [17, 22]. This implies that bots belonging
to the P2P botnet form an overlay network and that the botmaster can use
any of the bots (P2P nodes) to distribute commands to other peers or to
collect information from them. P2P botnets are realized either by using some
of the existing P2P transfer protocols, such as Kademlia [25], Bittorent [26]
and Overnet [27], or by custom P2P protocols. While more complex and
perhaps more costly to manage and operate compared to centralized botnets,
P2P botnets offer higher resiliency, since even if the signiﬁcant portion of the
botnet is taken down the remaining bots may still be able to communicate
with each other and with the botmaster. However, P2P botnets are commonly
characterized with high latency and low reliability of C&C communication,
which severely limits the overall efﬁciency of orchestrating attacks.
Some of the recent botnets [28] have adopted more advanced hybrid net-
work architectures, that combine the principles of centralized and decentral-
ized botnets. The hybrid botnets use advanced hybrid P2P communication
protocols in order to combine the resiliency of P2P botnets with the low la-
tency of centralized botnets. The hybrid botnet architecture has been investi-
gated by several authors [23, 24] suggesting that in order to provide both re-
silience and low latency of communication hybrid botnets should be realized
as networks in which bots are interconnected in P2P fashion and organized
in two distinct groups i.e. the group of proxy bots and the group of work-
ing bots. Working bots would implement the malicious agenda while proxy
bots would relay C&C messages between bots and the botmaster. Work-
ing bots would periodically connect to the proxy bots in order to receive
commands. Based on the work presented in [23, 24] this topology provides
higher resilience to take down efforts and improvements in the latency of
C&C messages comparing to traditional P2P botnets.
Malicious activities
As already partly illustrated malware can facilitate a variety of sophisticated
malicious and illegal activities. Some of the most prominent include identity
theft, information stealing, pay-per-install (PPI), click fraud, adware, malware
distribution, spam distribution, DDoS attacks, mining digital currencies and
the attacks targeted at industrial control systems and critical infrastructure.
The presented attack strategies produce more or less distinguishable be-
havior at both client- and network-level. The attack strategies rely on the
network communication to different degrees. Identity theft and Information
stealing involve transferring sensitive client data over the network. A number
of recent data breaches where realized using sophisticated malware that was
able to steal an enormous amount of data over the network [29]. As an ex-
ample, the hacker group responsible for the Sony Pictures hacking case [30]
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has claimed that they stole over 100 TB of sensitive data, from which 200GB
was publicly released [31]. Spam distribution without any doubt represents
one of the malicious activities with the largest network footprint. Report by
Cisco SecurityWorks [32] from 2008 indicates that top botnets are capable of
sending over 100 billion spam e-mails per day. Some of the most famous
spamming botnets such as Grum was responsible for 26% of world’s spam
email trafﬁc in 2012 and during its peak it could send 39.6 billion spam mes-
sages daily [20]. Finally, DDoS attacks pose a serious challenge to the existing
Internet infrastructure. The DDoS attacks are usually implemented by bot-
nets and their power is commonly measured in Gb/s. Arbor Network reports
that the largest monitored and veriﬁed attack in 2014 was 325.05 Gb/s [33].
It should also be noted that the attacks have been growing in their power
and sophistication over the last decade. Other attack strategies also include
network activities such as downloading malware payload, network scanning
for vulnerabilities, etc.
Resilience techniques
One of the primary goals of the malware operation is ﬂying under the radar
of detection and neutralization systems. Therefore, malware is equipped with
a diversity of resilience techniques capable of providing the stealthiness and
robustness of operation. Resilience techniques can be implemented both on
client and network levels.
Client-level resilience techniques provide the robustness of malware to
detection at the client machines and hinder both static and dynamic analysis
of malicious code [34–36]. Some of the most prominent client-level resilience
techniques are:
• Packing - represents the techniques of forming a binary ﬁle composed
of compressed versions of executable ﬁles. The use of packing within
the binary ﬁle hides parts of their content thus preventing the analysis.
• Polymorphic and metamorphic code - represent code obfuscation tech-
niques that enable the malware code to mutate without changing the
functions or the semantics of its payload. Hence, malware binaries of
the same botnet are commonly different from each other. Using these
techniques malware evades conventional detection solutions that de-
pend on the signatures of malware binaries.
• Obfuscation of behavioral patterns - represent resilience techniques that
obfuscate malware behavior at the client computer and thus hamper the
system for monitoring client-level forensics [37].
• Rootkit ability - represents one of the most challenging resilience tech-
niques deployed by malware at the client-level as it provides the mal-
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ware with the ability to operate on kernel-level [38, 39]. Having the
rootkit ability, the malware is able to defeat the majority of malware
tracking systems implemented at client machines.
The client-level resilience techniques have proved to be very effective in
avoiding modern detection systems, thus posing the great challenges to au-
tomatized detection at client-level. As a result, the majority of the contem-
porary detection methods focus on the analysis of network trafﬁc produced
by compromised computers [13, 14]. The following section presents more on
the existing detection solutions.
Network-level resilience techniques have a goal of hampering detection of
malware based on network trafﬁc analysis by providing the secrecy and in-
tegrity of communication between compromised machines and the attacker,
preserving the anonymity of the attacker, and facilitating the robustness of
the C&C channel to take down efforts. Some of the most important means
of providing secrecy of C&C communication are obfuscation of existing and
development of custom communication protocols, as well as the encryption
of the communication channel. Using these techniques, the security and the
integrity of communication are preserved, thus efﬁciently defeating detec-
tion methods that rely on content of the trafﬁc payloads for detection. Other
commonly used techniques that provide resilience of malware network oper-
ation are DNS-based resilience techniques such as Fast-ﬂux [40] and Domain-
ﬂux [41]. These techniques are characterized with the ability to dynamically
change domain names and IP addresses associated with a particular service
over time and they are commonly referred to as “agile” DNS trafﬁc [42].
Agile DNS is widely abused by cyber criminals in order to avoid existing
detection methods and take down techniques, thus providing the resilience
of malicious services and C&C communication.
Fast-ﬂux refers to the constant changing of IP address information re-
lated to a particular domain name [40]. Botnet operators abuse this ability to
change IP address information associated with a host name by linking mul-
tiple IP addresses with a speciﬁc host name and rapidly changing the linked
addresses. Fast-ﬂux [40] is widely used by the botnets to hide phishing and
malware delivery sites behind a dynamic network of compromised hosts act-
ing as proxies. This way the anonymity of C&C servers and the attacker is
protected, while providing more reliable malicious service.
Domain-ﬂux is effectively the inverse of Fast-ﬂux and refers to the con-
stant changing and allocation of multiple domains to a single or multiple IP
addresses. DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) [41] is one of the most
prominent Domain-ﬂux techniques. DGA periodically generates a large
number of domain names that can be used to reach C&C communication in-
frastructure. Bots using the DGA generate large number of pseudo-random
domain names that are queried to determine addresses of the C&C servers.
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The large number of domains generated each day makes their blacklisting
difﬁcult. Using DGA as a backup strategy higher resilience and robustness
of C&C communication is achieved.
1.2 ZeroAccess botnet - the case study
ZeroAccess represents a sophisticated malware that targets Microsoft Win-
dows operating systems. Computers compromised with this malware be-
come a part of a notorious ZeroAccess botnet, which is one of the most ad-
vanced botnets observed during the last decade [43]. The ZeroAccess botnet
was ﬁrst detected in May 2011, while in 2012 at its peak it had an estimated
size of over 1 million bots. This botnet is predominantly involved in click
fraud and Bitcoin mining but it also has the capability of implementing a
number of other attack campaigns. In December 2013 Microsoft led a coali-
tion aimed at taking down ZeroAccess C&C network. The take down cam-
paign was only partially effective as not all C&C servers were seized. As
a result, the botnet was able to resurrect through its peer-to-peer command
and control infrastructure. However, some of the latest studies show that
the ZeroAccess botnet is only a shadow of former self, numbering 50.000
compromised machines globally [44].
The ZeroAccess botnet relies on a number of advanced propagation, re-
silience and attack techniques that are summarized below:
Infection vectors - ZeroAccess botnet utilizes different infection vectors
where the most common is using exploit kits such as Blackhole [45],
where the users are lured into vising the web page with a malicious
script build in. This script tries to compromise the client by differ-
ent software vulnerabilities and infecting it with a dropper program.
The dropper program then downloads the ZeroAccess malware. Alter-
natively, the ZeroAccess malware is distributed through a number of
trojan programs such as keygens, cracks and similar. Finally, the Ze-
roAccess malware is often downloaded by other malicious software as
it has a very lucrative pay-per-install afﬁliate program.
C&C communication - This botnet employs sophisticated C&C infrastruc-
ture realized using custom P2P communication protocol. The C&C in-
frastructure has a hierarchical topology with number of super nodes
that have a public IP address and working nodes behind the NAT. The
P2P protocol relies on distributed list of peers between which UDP and
TCP communication is realized. The ZeroAccess malware comes with
hard-coded list of IP addresses and UDP and TCP port numbers. Fur-
thermore, this malware relies on HTTP to report back to the attacker.
Here the malware is using DGA as a resilience technique for discover-
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ing the rendezvous point. Finally, all network communication used by
the botnet is encrypted.
Attack campaigns - ZeroAccess botnet is predominantly implementing click
fraud and Bitcoin mining as attack campaigns. These malicious cam-
paigns are deployed by plug-ins programs downloaded by the ZeroAc-
cess malware. The fact that the botnet is relying on malicious plug-ins
indicates that it offers the possibility of easily extending its malicious
capabilities. Each of the plug-ins have its own C&C and update mech-
anisms. These mechanisms are often related to the ZeroAccess C&C
infrastructure indicating that the same people are behind the malicious
plug-ins and the botnet itself.
Detection opportunities
As illustrated in the previous modern malware represents complex phenom-
ena that manifests itself in different aspects and thus offering various oppor-
tunities for detection. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of ZeroAccess
botnet and the type of detection methods that could target each of the partic-
ular characteristics. Similarly, to any other malicious software ZeroAccess can
be tackled both by client and network-level detection, targeting the behavior
of malware at client machine and its network activity, respectively.
Table 1: Zero Access botnet - the analysis of detection opportunities.
Operation phase Characteristics Detection methods
Infection vectors
Exploit kits (with droppers) Client-level, Network-level
Trojan horses (keygens, cracks, games) Client-level
Downloaded by other malicious software Client-level, Network-level
C&C communication
P2P network Network-level
Hard-coded UDP and TCP ports Network-level
Phone home via HTTP Network-level
Attack campaigns
Click fraud Network-level
Bitcoin mining Client-level, Network-level
Crypto ransomware Client-level
Search engine redirection Client-level, Network-level
Sending SPAM Network-level
Arbitrary ﬁle download Network-level
Resilience techniques
Rootkit ability Static analysis
Malware packer (dropper) Static analysis
Anti-debugging Static analysis
Encrypted trafﬁc Network-level
DGA (phone home) Network-level
Client-level detection has a number of challenges in the case of ZeroAccess
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malware. First, certain variations of the malware have rootkit ability and op-
erate on kernel-level. Furthermore, the dropper uses different resilience tech-
niques such as code packing while ZeroAccess malware is equipment with
anti-debugging techniques. These techniques signiﬁcantly harden the use of
static and dynamic code analysis. However, it should be noted that client-
level analysis and especially static analysis could still provide very important
information as the malware comes with hard coded list of IP addresses and
TCP/UDP ports that are used for C&C communication.
Network-level detection could target different trafﬁc characteristics and
could be implemented at different parts of network. First, as the ZeroAccess
botnet relies on a hard coded list of peer IP addresses and UDP and TCP
ports it can be tackled using relatively trivial IP address and port blacklisting
techniques as well as port number based classiﬁers. However, the malware
has mechanisms for updating its infrastructure by periodically changing the
peers list and the port numbers, thus limiting the use of above mentioned
detection methods. Alternatively, the ZeroAccess network activity could be
tackled by targeting different traits of botnet trafﬁc, such as periodicity of
network trafﬁc, trafﬁc distribution, etc. In addition, the malware could be
targeted based on the principles of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) but only
with a limited impact as the botnet encrypts all C&C communication. Finally,
as the botnet is relying on DGA it is possible to use DNS trafﬁc analysis in
order to identify pseudo-random domain names used by the botnet. The
network-level detection can be realized both closer to client machines at local
and enterprise networks as well as in the higher network tiers depending
on the chosen principles of detection. The analysis of DNS trafﬁc could be
suiting for detection even in ISP networks while other approaches would
preferably be implemented to implementation at local/enterprise networks.
Based on the presented we can conclude that different detection methods
could be used in order to discover comprised machines in the case of the Ze-
roAccess botnet. The detection methods target different botnet characteristics
and are often complementary. The following section examines different ap-
proaches to malware detection specially focusing on network-based detection
and the use of machine learning for identifying malware network activities.
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2 Network-based detection
This section provides an overview of the existing malware detection ap-
proaches. The section focuses on the use of network trafﬁc analysis for the
detection of botnets.
Conventional malware detection approaches are deployed at client com-
puters targeting malware operating at compromised machines [46–52]. These
methods are usually referred to as client-based detection approaches. The
client-based detection approaches typically rely on the signatures of mali-
cious software as in the case of conventional Anti-Virus (AV) solutions. In
addition to matching signature of malicious binaries the client-based ap-
proaches can perform behavioral analysis by examining different client-level
forensics, for instance, application and system logs, active processes, key-logs
and the usage of system resources [46–52]. Finally, the client-based detec-
tion can also include examination of trafﬁc visible on the computer’s net-
work interfaces in order to identify some of the signs of malicious network
use [53–55].
As already indicated in the Section 1, modern malware relies on the Inter-
net for different actions such as the propagation, the communication with the
attacker and the deployment of different attack strategies. It could even be
claimed that all modern malware relies on Internet communication in some
phases of operation. Malware that would not produce any network activity
would consequently severely limit their malicious potential. Such malware
could only be used in tailored denial of service attacks towards specially
selected targets. Network activity produced by malware is an important in-
dicator of their operation and it is often seen as one of the most important
resource for malware detection. As a result, many authors have turned their
attention to network-based detection that relies on the analysis of network traf-
ﬁc for identifying compromised computers [14, 56]. Network-based detec-
tion approaches are deployed at an “edge” of the network (usually in routers
or ﬁrewalls), providing detection of computers compromised by malware
by analyzing network trafﬁc. This class of methods identiﬁes compromised
computers by recognizing network trafﬁc produced by them within all three
phases of their life-cycle i.e. the infection phase, the C&C communication
phase and the attack phase. These approaches are commonly referred to as
intrusion detection systems (IDS) [14, 21].
In parallel with network- and client-based detection methods a novel class
of collaborative detection methods has emerged [55, 57–59]. This class of
methods concludes about the existence of malware on the basis of observa-
tions gathered at both client and network levels. The main hypothesis behind
collaborative detection is that it is possible to provide robust and accurate
detection by correlating ﬁndings of independent client- and network-based
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detection systems. This class of detection approaches embraces the idea that
there is no “silver bullet” in security as all of the detection solutions have
their challenges and drawbacks and they could be avoided by malware if
a sufﬁcient effort is invested by the attacker. On the other side, the collab-
orative detection solutions that integrate the principles of diverse detection
systems would require substantial effort in order to be avoided. In order to
avoid such a collaborative detection method, the attacker would need to ei-
ther signiﬁcantly limit the attack potentials in order to be stealthier or make
the malware operation more dynamic thus investing additional time and ef-
fort. The motivation for a collaborative detection can be found in the analysis
of the ZeroAcess botnet presented in the previous section. The ZeroAccess is
characterized with a number of resilience techniques that harden both client-
and network-level detection. On the client-level there are rootkit ability, anti-
debugging techniques and code packing, while on network-level trafﬁc there
are trafﬁc encryption and the use of DGA as a relaying technique. This in-
dicates that correlating ﬁndings from client- and network-based detection
solutions could greatly contribute to effective detection.
2.1 Opportunities of network-based detection
There are several conceptual differences between client- and network-based
detection because of which network-based detection is often seen as a more
promising solution. Network-based detection is targeting the essential as-
pects of botnet and the functioning of modern malware, i.e. network trafﬁc
produced as the result of their operation. Network-based approaches assume
that in order to implement their malicious functions botnets and malware in
general have to exhibit certain network activity. They could make their oper-
ation stealthier by limiting the intensity of attack campaigns (sending spam,
launching DDoS attacks, scanning for vulnerabilities, etc.) and by tainting
and obfuscating C&C communication. However, this often contradicts the
goal of providing the most prompt, powerful and efﬁcient implementation of
malicious campaigns. On the other side, attackers invest great efforts in mak-
ing the presence of malware undetectable at compromised machines through
a number of client level resilience techniques such as rootkit ability and code
obfuscation [34–36]. Attackers also try to deploy a number of network based
resilience techniques such as Fast-ﬂux, Domain-ﬂux and encryption but these
techniques often introduce additional trafﬁc traits that can be used for detec-
tion [60, 61]. Furthermore, as network-based detection is primarily based on
the passive analysis of network trafﬁc it is more stealthy in its operation and
even undetectable to attackers in comparison to the client-based detection
which could be detected by the malware operating at the compromised ma-
chine. Finally, depending of the point of trafﬁc monitoring network-based de-
tection can have a wider scope then the client-level detection systems. When
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deployed in core and ISP networks network-based detection approaches are
able to capture trafﬁc from a larger number of client machines. This provides
the ability of capturing additional aspects of botnet phenomena, for instance,
group behavior of bots within the botnet, time regularities of bots’ activity
and diurnal propagation characteristics of botnets.
The point of trafﬁc monitoring
Based on the point of trafﬁc monitoring the approaches can target malware at
client machines, local and enterprise networks and large-scale ISP networks.
The main difference between different types of methods is in the network
scope they cover. By analyzing trafﬁc at the client machine only one com-
promised machine can be detected while implementing the detection system
further from client machines would include trafﬁc from multiple potentially
compromised machines. However, implementing trafﬁc monitoring in the
higher network tiers implies the need for processing larger amount of data.
Detection of malware at local and enterprise networks is implemented
closer to client machines usually in the routers or gateways connecting certain
enterprise network to the Internet. Enterprise or campus networks are usu-
ally realized as a set of LANs (Local Area Networks) where some of them can
be geographically separated. These networks are usually based on heteroge-
neous communication technologies while relying on VLAN (Virtual LAN)
for the networking of geographically distanced LANs. A typical example of
such network is university campus network or enterprise network.
The main opportunities for trafﬁc monitoring at enterprise networks are
following. First, trafﬁc is monitored closer to client machines thus having the
capabilities of more precisely pinpointing potentially compromised clients.
In enterprise network one organization is usually the owner of the infrastruc-
ture thus having the ability of identifying compromised machines in more
details. It should not be forgotten that NAT (Network Address Translation)
is also used within enterprise networks so it could possibly pose some chal-
lenges in identifying compromised clients. However, at least the network is
owned by the same organization so the problematic clients could be more
easily identiﬁed. Second, the enterprise networks are usually characterized
by a relatively manageable amount of trafﬁc, opening possibilities for more
detailed analysis of network trafﬁc in on-line scenarios.
The main drawbacks of monitoring trafﬁc at enterprise networks is the
fact that this does not give a “bigger” picture on the operation of botnets.
Botnets are characterized by a usually large set of compromised machines
distributed over different countries and networks of different ISPs. Further-
more, these machines are relying on the same C&C infrastructure thus con-
tacting same C&C servers, using the same sets of DGA generated domains,
etc. Finally, botnets implement often distributed attack campaigns such as
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DDoS attacks, click fraud and spam distribution. This creates a signiﬁcant
amount of distinguishable characteristics that can be used for identifying bot-
nets. Monitoring trafﬁc at enterprise network would not be able to identify
the majority of these characteristics such as group behavior of bots, diurnal
nature of bot activity, C&C infrastructure shared by many bots, etc.
Detection of malware in ISP networks is implemented further away from
client machines usually in the backbone routers or at DNS servers. Moni-
toring trafﬁc in these networks is fundamentally different from trafﬁc mon-
itoring at local/enterprise networks. However, some of the differences at
the same time deﬁne the main opportunities of these approaches. First, by
monitoring trafﬁc in ISP network there is possibility of capturing a series of
botnet characteristics not visible from the local perimeter. However, the main
drawbacks of monitoring trafﬁc at ISP network is the fact that there is a vast
amount of trafﬁc that need to be processed. This often requires the use of
costly network trafﬁc sniffers, while processing such a large amount of data
in on-line fashion represents a great computational challenge. Furthermore,
the use of NAT in this case poses more critical challenge as such systems
would usually only be able to identify public IP addresses of the networks of
large companies or organization in which compromised computers “hide”.
The principles of operation
The existing network-based detection approaches rely on various principles
of operation. Based on the stealthiness of functioning detection methods can
be classiﬁed as passive or active. The passive detection approaches do not
interfere with malware operation directly, but operate based on observation
only, which makes them stealthy in their operation and undetectable by the
attacker. The active detection methods, on the other hand, are more invasive
methods that actively interfere with malicious activities or C&C communica-
tion [62]. Additionally, these techniques often target speciﬁc heuristics of the
C&C communication or the attack campaign, providing higher precision of
detection at the expense of ﬂexibility and generality of the approach.
In parallel with the classiﬁcation of botnet detection based on the place of
implementation or the stealthiness of functioning the methods can be classi-
ﬁed based on their functional characteristics. Typically, network-based detec-
tion approaches can be classiﬁed as signature-based or anomaly-based detection.
Signature-based detection
Signature-based methods identify malicious network trafﬁc based on a set of
signatures and rules on how does malicious trafﬁc look like [63–67]. This
class of detection approaches draws its functional principles on conventional
IDS/IPS solutions that are usually based on DPI and matching signatures and
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rules of anomalous network trafﬁc. The signatures can have different form
and commonly include regular expressions of payload strings, deﬁned rules
regarding malicious ports and suspicious IP addresses and rules regarding
common sequence of communication actions within the botnet life-cycle. This
class of detection techniques covers all three phases of botnet life-cycle and it
is able to detect known trafﬁc anomalies with high precision and commonly
low number of false positives. The main drawback of signature-based ap-
proaches is that they are only able to detect known threats, and that efﬁcient
use of these approaches requires constant update of signatures. Additionally,
these techniques are vulnerable to various evasion techniques that change
the characteristics of malicious trafﬁc, such as encryption and obfuscation of
C&C channel, Fast-ﬂux, Domain-ﬂux, etc.
Anomaly-based detection
Anomaly-based detection is a class of detection methods that is devoted to
the detection of trafﬁc anomalies that can indicate existence of compromised
machines within the network [68–78]. The trafﬁc anomalies that could be
used for detection differ from easily detectable as changes in trafﬁc rate, la-
tency, to more ﬁnite anomalies in ﬂow patterns. Some of the most prominent
anomaly-based approaches detect anomalies in packet payloads [69], DNS
trafﬁc [77, 78], botnet group behavior [76, 79], etc. The anomaly-based de-
tection can be realized using different algorithms ranging from the statistical
approaches, machine learning techniques, graph analysis, etc. In contrast to
the signature-based approaches, the anomaly detection is generally able to
detect new forms of malicious activity and it is more robust to existing botnet
resilience techniques. However, some challenges in using anomaly-based
detection still exist. This class of techniques requires the knowledge of
anomalies that characterize botnet trafﬁc. Additionally, trafﬁc produced by
modern botnets is often similar to the “normal” trafﬁc, resulting in many
false positives. Finally, the anomaly detection methods often have to analyze
a vast amount of data, which is difﬁcult to perform in real-time, making
the detection of a ﬁne-grained anomalies in large-scale networks often a
prohibitive task. One of the novel and the most promising anomaly-based
methods is the group of detection methods that rely on machine learning al-
gorithms (MLAs) for detection of malware-related trafﬁc patterns. This class
of detection methods promises automated detection that can infer on how
does malicious and benign trafﬁc look like from available trafﬁc observations.
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2.2 Machine learning-based detection
MLAs have found their use for network-based malware detection due to
several reasons. MLAs have the ability to ﬁnd similarities i.e. “patterns”
within a large amount of data. The main assumption of machine learning-
based approaches is that malware create distinguishable patterns within the
network trafﬁc and that these patterns could be efﬁciently detected using
MLA [46, 80]. Malware detection approaches promise automated data-driven
detection that infers knowledge about malicious network trafﬁc from the vast
amount of available trafﬁc traces. One of the major appeals of using MLAs is
the possibility of automated operation with limited operator’s involvement.
Furthermore, MLAs can be used to discover anomalies from data, without
the need for prior knowledge about them. Finally, combining the character-
istics of MLAs with “big data” techniques and capable computing units we
get a powerful weapon against the malware threat.
Machine Learning (ML), is a branch of artiﬁcial intelligence, that has the
goal of constructing and studying systems that can learn from data [81].
Learning in this context implies ability to recognize complex patterns and
make qualiﬁed decisions based on previously seen data. The main challenge
of machine learning is generalizing knowledge derived from the limited set
of previous experiences, in order to produce a useful decision for new, pre-
viously unseen, events. To tackle this problem, the ﬁeld of machine learning
develops an array of algorithms that discover knowledge from data, based on
sound statistical and computational principles. Machine learning algorithms
can be coarsely classiﬁed based on the desired outcome of the algorithm as
supervised MLAs and unsupervised MLAs.
Supervised MLAs [82] is the class of well-deﬁned machine learning al-
gorithms that generate a function (i.e., model) that maps inputs to desired
outputs. These algorithms are trained by examples of inputs and their corre-
sponding outputs, and then they are used to predict output for some future
inputs. The supervised MLAs are used for classifying input data into some
deﬁned class and for the regression i.e. predicting continuous valued output.
In the context of network-based malware and botnet detection, supervised
MLAs are commonly used for implementing network trafﬁc classiﬁers that
are able to classify malicious from benign trafﬁc or identify trafﬁc belonging
to different malware families. Some of the most popular supervised MLA for
network-based detection are: SVM (Support Vector Machines), ANN (Artiﬁ-
cial Neural Networks), Decision tree classiﬁers and Bayesian classiﬁer.
Unsupervised MLAs [83] is the class of machine learning algorithms
where training data consists of a set of inputs without any corresponding out-
put values. The goal of unsupervised learning may be to discover groups of
similar examples within the input data, referred to as clustering, to determine
the distribution of data within the input space, known as density estimation,
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or to project the data from a high-dimensional space down to two or three
dimensions for the purpose of visualization. In the context of network-based
malware and botnet detection, unsupervised MLAs are commonly used for
discovering similarities that characterize malicious network trafﬁc. The main
characteristic of unsupervised MLAs is that they do not need to be trained
beforehand. The most popular unsupervised MLAs used for network-based
detection are: K-means, X-means and Hierarchical clustering.
In both learning scenarios trafﬁc is analyzed from a certain analysis per-
spective that entails how do trafﬁc instances, that will be classiﬁed or clus-
tered by MLAs, look like. For each of trafﬁc instances a set of features is ex-
tracted and used within the MLAs to represent them. Choosing the right fea-
tures representation is one of the most challenging task of practical deploy-
ment of MLAs. The chosen features should capture targeted botnet trafﬁc
characteristics and pose balanced requirements in terms of feature extraction
and selection. Finally, in parallel with the two learning problems outlined
here modern machine learning-based approaches commonly implement de-
tection through several phases, using the combination of different MLAs or
by deploying MLAs in an adaptive manner. This way ﬁne-grained, ﬂexible,
and adaptable detection can be achieved.
Various detection methods have been developed using an array of MLAs
deployed in diverse setups [56]. An extensive overview of the contemporary
detection approaches based on machine learning can be found in Section 4.
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3 Problem Statement
This thesis tackles the problem of network-based malware detection by
proposing novel detection approaches that aim at achieving the detection of
malicious network activity in less time and expense. The thesis explores the
possibilities of developing a novel collaborative approach to botnet protec-
tion that would utilize insights from various detection sensors. We focus on
network-based detection aspects of the collaborative framework by devising
detection approaches that are aimed at identifying malware network activity
at different points in the network and based on different, mutually comple-
mentary, principles of trafﬁc analysis. The detection approaches proposed by
the thesis rely on machine learning for identifying malicious network trafﬁc
evaluating the capabilities of machine learning algorithms to provide accu-
rate and time-efﬁcient detection. The proposed approaches are developed
in order to cover different aspects of malware network activity and thus be
suitable candidates for a future collaborative protection system. Finally, the
thesis provides a comprehensive overview of existing network-based detec-
tion approaches with the focus on machine learning-based approaches.
The overall problem statement addressed by this thesis can be formulated
as the following:
Can malware network activity be detected in accurate and time-efﬁcient manner
within the operational network environment using machine learning techniques?
We address the outlined problem by answering the following research ques-
tions:
• How can a collaborative approach to botnet detection be realized?
• What are the main challenges of using machine learning for network-based
malware detection and how can they be overcome?
• How can malicious network activities be identiﬁed at enterprise networks?
• How can malicious network activities be identiﬁed in ISP networks?
Research question 1: How can a collaborative approach to bot-
net detection be realized?
Modern malware represents complex phenomena that can be tackled using a
diverse set of detection methods that target different aspects of the malware
operation. Malware is targeted by both client- and network-based detection
solutions, while detection based on network trafﬁc analysis can be imple-
mented in different parts of the network targeting different traits of malicious
trafﬁc. One of the challenging research questions is how can the information
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from diverse detection systems be used in order to develop more effective
detection in comparison with the independent detection systems.
We answer the presented research question by proposing a novel frame-
work for collaborative botnet protection based on indications that originate
from a multiple set of sensors deployed at both client machines as well as in
different parts of network in order to achieve accurate and reliable detection.
We stress the crucial role of network-based detection is such a framework
and the possibility of complementary network-based detection solutions that
are based on different principles of trafﬁc analysis and deployed at different
points in the network.
Research question 2: What are the main challenges of using
machine learning for network-based botnet detection and how
can they be overcome?
MLAs have been successfully used for identifying malware network activity
by a number of detection approaches over the last decade [14, 56]. However,
the popularity of this class of detection approaches within scientiﬁc commu-
nity is not necessarily followed by their wide-spread use within operational
networks [84]. This discrepancy is often based on the characteristics of MLAs
and should be properly understood in order to develop detection approaches
that will have a good outlook of being implemented in real-world detection
solutions.
We answer the presented research question by providing a comprehen-
sive overview of the existing work on the use of MLA for identifying botnet
network trafﬁc. Our goal is to clarify the opportunities and the challenges of
using MLAs for network-based detection, in order to be able to develop more
robust and reliable detection solutions. Furthermore, we contribute to solv-
ing the “ground truth” problem as one of the most crucial challenges of the
effective use of MLAs, by proposing a novel approach to labeling agile DNS
trafﬁc. Finally, we elaborate on a number of pitfalls that should be avoided
in order to make machine learning-based detection approaches more suitable
for the use in operational networks.
Research question 3: How can malicious network activities be
identiﬁed at enterprise networks?
The analysis the network trafﬁc on local and enterprise networks have an
advantage of being able to capture more precise patterns of malicious trafﬁc
and having full visibility of client machines within the network. The trafﬁc
load on local network is arguably suited to even complex trafﬁc analysis
approaches. A number of detection approaches target malicious trafﬁc at
local networks using MLAs. The approaches cover different types of malware
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network activity and report varying detection performance, thus opening the
space for novel detection approaches that would provide more accurate and
efﬁcient detection.
We address the presented research question by devising a series of de-
tection methods for identifying botnet network trafﬁc at local and enterprise
networks. The proposed detection methods evaluate several trafﬁc analysis
scenarios in order to conclude on the ability of providing accurate and timely
detection using MLA.
Research question 4: How can malicious network activities be
identiﬁed in ISP networks?
The analysis of network trafﬁc in ISP networks offers both a number of op-
portunities and challenges. These approaches have the advantage of having a
more comprehensive overview on the network thus being able to capture fun-
damental characteristics of botnet such as group behavior of compromised
client machines. The main challenge of these approaches is the high traf-
ﬁc load that need to be processed. This is commonly solved by ﬁltering or
sampling the trafﬁc. Alternatively, some authors rely on DNS trafﬁc as it
represents only a subset of total amount of trafﬁc, and it is widely used by
malware in different phases of their life-cycle.
We answer the presented research question by proposing a novel ap-
proach for identifying potentially compromised clients based on DNS trafﬁc
analysis in large-scale ISP networks. The proposed detection method relies on
MLA for identifying malicious agile domains-to-IPs mappings i.e. Fast-ﬂux
and Domain-ﬂux as resilience techniques often used by malware. Further-
more, the approach is able to pinpoint potentially compromised clients that
have contributed to identiﬁed malicious mappings.
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This section presents the state of the art on network-based detection ap-
proaches with the focus on the use of machine learning for identifying mal-
ware trafﬁc activity. The section presents the contemporary scientiﬁc efforts
on botnet detection by answering a series of relevant questions regarding the
existing work. The section provides a comprehensive outlook on the charac-
teristics of the existing methods, opportunities they offer and their challenges
and limitations.
4.1 Collaborative detection
In this subsection we answer a series of relevant questions regarding exist-
ing collaborative detection methods pinpointing the role of network-based
detection within them.
• What are the most well-regarded collaborative detection approaches?
Faced with many challenges of detecting modern malware, scientiﬁc
community turned their efforts to the development of novel collabora-
tive class of detection approaches that integrate diverse principles of
botnet detection. The general approach of correlating aspects of behav-
ior observed by various sensors is elaborated by Oliner et al. [85] and
Flaglien et al. [86] extending older proposals for the correlation of alerts
in IDS systems made by Cuppens and Miège [87] and Ning et al. [88].
Building on these concepts several authors have proposed botnet de-
tection systems that correlate alerts from diverse detection entities in
order to achieve more accurate and reliable detection [55, 57–59]. The
basic characteristics of the existing collaborative detection methods are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Contemporary collaborative botnet detection methods
Detection Method
Client-level Network-level Trafﬁc Monitoring Correlation of
Analysis Analysis Point Findings
Zeng et al. [55]
Classiﬁcation of Clustering of
Client, LAN, Campus
Score-based
client-level behavior trafﬁc ﬂows correlation
Wang et al. [57]
Support for various Support for various
Client, LAN, ISP
Dempster-Shafer
client-level detection network-level detection theory
methods methods
Muthumanickam et al. [58]
Clustering of Clustering of
LAN, Campus
Score-based
client-level behavior P2P nodes correlation
He et al. [59]
Conventional AV Clustering of
LAN
Score-based
solutions trafﬁc ﬂows correlation
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• What are the basic principles of collaborative detection presented by
existing work?
The contemporary detection methods propose collaborative detection
using diverse principles of client- and network-level analysis as well as
correlation of ﬁndings from different detection sensors. The client-level
analysis typically includes the analysis of malware behavioral at client
machines by analyzing changes to ﬁle system, registry keys, function
calls, and so forth [55, 58]. Some approaches rely on conventional AV
solutions for providing input on potentially compromised clients [59].
The analyzed approaches commonly rely on MLA as a tool for iden-
tifying client-level malware behavior [55, 58]. The existing work ana-
lyzes network trafﬁc by deploying network sensors at different points
in network, commonly local and campus networks. Furthermore, in
the majority of addressed approaches MLAs are used in order to clus-
ter network observations. Framework proposed by Wang et al. [57]
provides the possibility of correlating ﬁndings from various client- and
network-based analysis solutions.
Network-based detection plays a crucial role in the existing collabora-
tive detection methods as modern malware is characterized by network
activity used for propagating, C&C communication and implementing
its malicious agenda. As an illustration, Zeng et al. [55] proposed the
framework that ﬁrst identiﬁes suspicious clients by discovering simi-
lar behavior among clients using ﬂow-based trafﬁc analysis, and then
validates the identiﬁed suspects to be malicious or not by scrutiniz-
ing their client-level behavior. In order to take the full advantage of
network trafﬁc analysis some existing approaches [55, 57] envision the
use of several network analysis entities employed at different points in
network starting from client machine to backbone networks.
The correlation of ﬁndings from independent analysis systems is com-
monly realized by custom scoring systems where detection indications
are contributing to detection score that can indicated existence of com-
promised clients [55, 58, 59], while Wang et al. [57] have envisioned
the use of Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory for fusing the indication from
different detection entities.
• What is the state of the operational deployment of these methods?
To the best of our knowledge existing collaborative detection methods
still have not seen a wider operational deployment, and are mainly
proofs of concept demonstrating that systems which combine informa-
tion from multiple sources can achieve increased accuracy in recog-
nizing the presence of compromised clients. In addition to technical
difﬁculties in realizing such detection systems there are legal and soci-
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ological difﬁculties as well. The realization of such detection solutions
requires an active role of ISPs followed by collaboration from end users.
Generally, ISPs should implement network trafﬁc analysis in the core
network as they are the owners of the infrastructure. They should also
be the one to persuade clients in adopting suitable client-level detection
solutions. An alternative approach would be to establish collaboration
between conventional AV companies that already provide client-level
detection solutions with ISPs. However, this solution would open some
concerns regarding sharing of clients’ information, that are yet to be
clariﬁed. Finally, current legislation in the many countries does not
ﬁnd ISPs accountable for any malicious activity in their network thus
not providing enough incentives for ISPs to invest in often complex
and expensive collaborative detection solutions. However, in the fu-
ture we should expect to see ISPs offering complete security solutions
based on the principles of collaborative detection as the service to their
customers.
4.2 Signature-based detection
In this subsection we answer a series of relevant questions regarding existing
signature-based detection methods.
• What are the most well-regarded signature-based detection ap-
proaches?
The signature-based detection represents one of the oldest classes
of network-based detection approaches that has its roots in conven-
tional IDS/IPS systems. Some of the most well-known contempo-
rary signature-based detection approaches are presented in Table 3.
Snort [63], Bro [64] and Suricata [65] represent some of the most widely
used IDS/IPS systems that have also found the use in identifying botnet
network trafﬁc. Gu et al. [66] and Goebel et al. [67] on the other hand
proposed detection approaches that are specially developed in order to
target botnets.
• What are the capabilities of existing detection methods?
The contemporary detection methods typically contribute to the iden-
tiﬁcation of compromised client machines i.e. bots [63–67] but can also
contribute to identiﬁcation of malicious C&C servers [63–66]. The ma-
jority of the analyzed detection approaches encompasses all phases of
operation while some as Goebel et al. [67] target C&C communication
as the main characteristic of botnet operation. Furthermore, the ap-
proach proposed by Goebel et al. is limited to IRC botnets while other
approaches are able to capture botnet detection independent of C&C
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Table 3: Contemporary signature-based botnet detection methods
Detection Method
Trafﬁc Monitoring Detection Botnet Operational Real-time Signatures
Point Target Type Phase Operation and Rules
Snort [63]
Propagation,
C&C, Attack
IP and port rules
Bro [64] Client, LAN, ISP Bots, C&C Servers Generic ∗ Communication sequence
Suricata [65] Payload content
Gu et al. [66] Client, LAN, ISP Bots, C&C Servers Generic
Propagation,
C&C, Attack
∗
Botnet life cycle
Goebel et al. [67] LAN, Campus Bots IRC C&C - Port, IRC nicknames
communication protocol. Finally, real-time operation is provided by the
majority of the approaches [63–66] facilitating on-line operation even in
large-scale networks.
• What are the basic principles of operation of existing signature-based
approaches?
This class of detection approaches draws from the principles of func-
tioning of conventional IDS/IPS solutions that are usually based on DPI
and matching signatures and rules regarding anomalous network traf-
ﬁc. The signatures and rules can have different form ranging from reg-
ular expressions of payload strings, deﬁned rules regarding malicious
ports, IP addresses and following common sequence of communication
actions within the botnet life-cycle. Snort [63], Bro [64] and Suricata [65]
rely on the libraries of rules on anomalous malicious trafﬁc as well as
signatures of malicious payloads. Gu et al. [66] and Goebel et al. [67]
approaches are on the other hand, specially developed to target the
signatures of botnet trafﬁc. Gu et al. [66] approach represents botnet
detection approach developed as the extension of Snort. The proposed
platform ensures efﬁcient botnet detection by adding the two anomaly
detection plug-ins on top of existing Snort’s signature database. The
approach deﬁnes a model of botnet infection dialog process and then
uses it as a guideline for the recognition of infection processes within
the network. Goebel et al. approach [67] is one of the ﬁrst detection
techniques to tackle IRC botnets. This approach provides botnet detec-
tion by matching IRC nicknames with nickname patterns of IRC bots.
• What are the main drawbacks of signature-based approaches?
The signature-based detection approaches rely on signatures and rules
regarding malicious network trafﬁc so they only capture “known”
anomalies of malicious trafﬁc and known attacks and intrusion. This is
the main drawback of this class of detection approaches as the attacker
is able to evade them by slightly changing network actions by obfus-
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cating and randomizing connection attempts. Furthermore, as these
detection techniques heavily rely on DPI they can be defeated using
payload encryption. Finally, although promising detection with zero
False Positives (FP), these approaches are often associated with a num-
ber of misidentiﬁed trafﬁc events due to build-in statistical approaches
and imprecise signatures and rules on malicious trafﬁc.
• What is the state of the operational deployment of these methods?
These methods have a wide operational implementation and they are an
integral part of many real-world detection systems. These approaches
are often used within enterprise networks while the latest implementa-
tions also promise the use of these approaches on high speed network
links. Some existing commercial solutions offer the implementations
of Snort and Gu et al. approach on top of high speed network snif-
fers that can be implemented in core networks at network links with
speeds higher than 10Gb/s [89]. The great adoption of signature-based
approaches in operational networks can be explained due to one of
the main requirements of operational networks which is low FP rates.
Operational networks do not tolerate high number of FP rates as that
would put additional stress on network operators and would deemed
the detection approach in question unreliable and consequently ig-
nored.
4.3 Anomaly-based detection
In this subsection we answer a series of relevant questions regarding existing
anomaly-based detection methods.
• What are the most well-regarded anomaly-based detection ap-
proaches?
The anomaly-based detection approaches target network trafﬁc anoma-
lies that characterize malware network activity by relying on different
anomaly detection algorithms. Some of the trafﬁc anomalies targeted by
these approaches are: group activities of compromised clients, the peri-
odicity of botnet network activity, scanning activity, etc. The overview
of some of the most well-known contemporary anomaly-based detec-
tion approaches is presented in Table 4.
• What are the capabilities of existing detection methods?
The contemporary anomaly-based detection methods are typically de-
veloped for identifying compromised client machines by monitoring
trafﬁc at local networks. Only a handful of approaches are capable of fa-
cilitating detection at ISP networks [76, 78]. The majority of approaches
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Table 4: Contemporary anomaly-based botnet detection methods
Detection Method
Trafﬁc Monitoring Detection Botnet Operational Real-time
Point Target Type Phase Operation
Binkley et al. [68] LAN Bots IRC C&C, Attack -
Gu et al. [69] LAN, Campus Bots, C&C Servers IRC, HTTP
Propagation,
C&C, Attack
-
Kang et al. [70] LAN Bots P2P C&C, Attack -
Wang [71] LAN, Campus Bots IRC C&C -
Ma et al. [72] LAN Bots, C&C Servers IRC C&C -
Al-Duwairi et al. [73] LAN Bots IRC, HTTP C&C, Attack -
Wang et al. [74] LAN Bots Generic C&C, Attack -
Yu et al. [75] LAN Bots Generic C&C, Attack ∗
Karasaridis et al. [76] ISP C&C Servers IRC C&C -
Villamarín-Salomón et al. [77] LAN, Campus Bots Generic C&C -
Ramachandran et al. [78] ISP Bots Generic C&C ∗
target speciﬁc types of botnets based on used C&C communication such
as IRC, HTTP and P2P, while some of the approaches are able to identify
botnets independent of C&C communication protocol [74, 75, 77, 78].
All analyzed detection approaches capture C&C phased while some
are also able to capture attack activities [68–70, 73–75]. Finally, real-time
operation is provided by handful of approaches such as Ramachandran
et al. [78] and Yu et al. [75].
• What are the basic principles of operation of existing anomaly-based
approaches?
This class of approaches targets a number of trafﬁc anomalies that char-
acterize botnets. Table 5 presents trafﬁc anomalies targeted by the
existing methods and anomaly detection algorithms used to capture
them. Some of the most popular trafﬁc anomalies are group behav-
ior [69, 76], packet size [70, 72–74], periodicity of behavior [72, 73] and
DNS request/response dynamics [77, 78]. The used anomaly detec-
tion algorithms greatly vary where some of the most well-known ones
are: threshold-based [68, 72, 78], fuzzy logic [73, 74], Discrete Fourier
Transformation [75] and Bayesian approach [76, 77]. In addition to the
presented anomaly detection approaches there is a prominent sub-class
of detection approaches that rely on MLA for detecting anomalous mal-
ware network activity. This sub-class of detection approaches is thor-
oughly analyzed in Subsection 4.4.
• What are the main drawbacks of anomaly-based approaches?
The main drawback of the anomaly-based approaches is the fact that
they commonly target a speciﬁc “known” anomaly of malicious net-
work activity. This class of detection approaches can commonly be suc-
cessfully avoided by changing the characteristics of malicious trafﬁc.
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Table 5: Contemporary anomaly-based botnet detection methods: targeted anomalies and
anomaly detection algorithms
Detection Method Targeted Anomaly Anomaly Detection Algorithm
Binkley et al. [68] TCP scanning activity Threshold-based
Gu et al. [69]
Long-lived C&C sessions
Correlation analysisActive response by bots
Bots group behavior
Kang et al. [70] Number of ICMP, UDP, SMTP packets Multi-chart CUSUM
Wang [71] Similarity of IRC nicknames Euclidean distance
Ma et al. [72] Packet size, Periodical repeatability Threshold-based, Ukkonen algorithm
Al-Duwairi et al. [73]
Packet size
Fuzzy LogicExchange ratio
Periodical repeatability
Wang et al. [74]
Failed DNS queries
Fuzzy Logic Pattern Recognition
DNS query intervals
Failed network connections
Payload sizes
Yu et al. [75]
Flow duration
Incremental Discrete Fourier Transform
Number of packets/bytes per ﬂow
Karasaridis et al. [76] Bots group behavior Bayesian approach / Modiﬁed K-means algorithm
Villamarín-Salomón et al. [77] DNS trafﬁc similarities Bayesian approach
Ramachandran et al. [78] DNSBL lookups by botmasters Threshold-based
This problem is solved by anomaly detection algorithms that are able
to learn from observations and adapt to the chaining nature of network
trafﬁc such as MLAs.
• What is the state of the operational deployment of these methods?
The principles of the anomaly-based detection are commonly used for
detecting malware related network trafﬁc within some of the existing
IDS/IPS systems. As an example, BotHunter [66] relies on the prin-
ciples of anomaly-based detection for identifying payload distribution
and scanning activities. In addition, many anomaly-based approaches
are capable of operating on large-scale networks [76, 78] and promise
real-time operation [75, 78] thus fulﬁlling some of the most important
requirements of operational deployment. Finally, machine learning-
based detection as a sub-class of anomaly-based detection has been a
part of many existing operational detection solutions.
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4.4 Machine learning-based detection
In this subsection we answer a series of relevant questions regarding existing
machine learning-based detection methods. The ﬁndings presented in the
following are based on a survey of contemporary machine learning-based
botnet detection approaches presented in Paper II.
• What are the most well-regarded machine learning-based detection
approaches?
Since 2006 when Livadas et al. [90] proposed the ﬁrst machine learning-
based approach targeted at IRC-based botnets a number of authors have
chosen to rely on MLAs for identifying patterns of malware related traf-
ﬁc [53–55, 90–106]. The existing approaches employ different principles
of network trafﬁc analysis, they rely on different MLAs and they pro-
vide varying performance of identifying malicious network trafﬁc. The
overview of the 20 most well-known contemporary machine learning-
based detection approaches is presented in Table 6.
Table 6: Contemporary machine learning-based botnet detection methods
Detection Method
Trafﬁc Monitoring Detection Botnet Operational Communication Real-time
Point Target Type Phase Protocol Operation
Masud et al. [53] Client C&C Servers IRC C&C, Attack TCP -
Shin et al. [54] Client Bots Generic C&C, Attack TCP, UDP, DNS -
Zeng et al. [55] Client, LAN, Campus Bots Generic C&C, Attack TCP, UDP -
Livadas et al. [90] LAN, Campus Bots IRC C&C TCP, IRC -
Strayer et al. [91] LAN, Campus Bots IRC C&C TCP, IRC potentially
Gu et al. [92] LAN, Campus Bots Generic
Propagation,
C&C, Attack
TCP, UDP potentially
Choi et al. [93] Campus, ISP Bots Generic C&C DNS advertised
Saad et al. [94] LAN Bots P2P C&C TCP, UDP -
Zhao et al. [95] LAN Bots P2P C&C, Attack TCP, UDP potentially
Zhang et al. [96] LAN, Campus Bots P2P C&C TCP, UDP potentially
Lu et al. [97] LAN Bots IRC C&C TCP, UDP potentially
Bilge et al. [98] ISP C&C Servers Generic C&C TCP, UDP advertised
Bilge et al. [99] ISP Bots, C&C Servers Generic C&C DNS advertised
Antonakakis et al. [100] ISP Bots, C&C Servers Generic C&C DNS potentially
Antonakakis et al. [101] ISP Bots, C&C Servers Generic C&C DNS potentially
Perdisci et al. [102] ISP Bots, C&C Servers Generic C&C DNS potentially
Tegeler et al. [103] LAN, ISP C&C servers Generic C&C TCP, UDP advertised
Zhao et al. [104] ISP Bots P2P C&C DNS -
Zhang et al. [105] LAN, Campus Bots P2P C&C TCP, UDP potentially
Haddadi et al. [106] LAN Bots HTTP C&C HTTP -
• What are the capabilities of existing detection methods?
The contemporary machine learning-based detection methods typically
contribute to the identiﬁcation of compromised client machines i.e.
bots [54, 55, 90–97, 104–106] or malicious C&C servers [53, 98, 103].
Detection methods that target malicious DNS trafﬁc [99–102] commonly
provide identiﬁcation of malicious domains which can contribute to the
detection of both bots that try to resolve them as well as C&C servers.
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The majority of the analyzed detection approaches target C&C commu-
nication as the main characteristics of botnet operation, while some also
include the ability to capture botnet attack campaigns [53–55, 92, 95].
The propagation phase is covered by only one detection method [92],
most likely as the propagation could be effectively tackled by existing
IDS/IPS systems.
The methods analyze different communication protocols in order to
perform botnet detection. The existing detection methods commonly
analyze TCP, UDP and DNS protocols as the main carriers of botnet net-
work activity. The majority of detection approaches rely on the analysis
of TCP and UDP trafﬁc while some more speciﬁcally cover IRC [90, 91]
and HTTP [106] protocols as they are targeting IRC and HTTP botnets.
One of the approaches analyzes all three protocols in order to capture
the majority of the botnet network activities [54].
A number of existing detection methods are independent of C&C com-
munication [54, 55, 92, 93, 98–103], while others target speciﬁc types
of botnets, such as IRC-based [53, 90, 91, 97], HTTP-based [106] and
P2P-based [94–96, 104, 105] botnets by relying on speciﬁc traits of IRC,
HTTP and P2P C&C channels, respectively. It should be noted that we
consider that DNS-based detection methods [99–102] can contribute to
the detection of botnets independent of the used C&C communication
technology.
The real-time operation is promised by only a subset of approaches [93,
98, 99, 103]. Some of the contemporary detection approaches show
the potential of providing real-time detection as they operate in a
time window and they could be periodically re-trained using the new
training set or by periodically updating the clusters of the observa-
tion [91, 92, 95–97, 100–102, 105]. Finally, some methods such as [99]
have proved their ability of real-time operation through a real-world
operational deployment.
• At what point in network existing methods monitor trafﬁc?
The machine learning-based approaches can be implemented at client
computers, local/enterprise networks and ISP networks. The majority
of contemporary detection approaches addressed by this survey moni-
tor trafﬁc at local [94, 95, 97, 106] and possibly campus/enterprise net-
works [90–93, 96, 105], while others can be implemented in core and
ISP networks [93, 98–104]. Finally, there are several approaches that tar-
get malware at client computers by strongly relying on network trafﬁc
analysis [53–55]. As already indicated in Section 2 the point of trafﬁc
monitoring deﬁnes the visibility of network space but also the princi-
ples of trafﬁc analysis.
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• What are the principles of trafﬁc analysis employed by contemporary
machine learning-based detection approaches?
The existing detection methods analyze network trafﬁc from different
perspectives i.e. based on different principles of analysis. Furthermore,
different methods rely on MLAs to different degree where in some
MLAs play only a minor role while in others MLAs are the key element
of the detection approach. Table 7 provides an overview of the prin-
ciples of trafﬁc analysis used by the contemporary machine-learning
detection approaches.
The existing methods use several perspectives of trafﬁc analysis. The
approaches that analyze TCP and UDP trafﬁc generally analyze it
from the perspective of trafﬁc “ﬂows”. It should be noted that def-
inition of a ﬂow varies from the approach to the approach so some
use NetFlow ﬂows [55, 98, 103] while others use a conventional def-
inition of trafﬁc ﬂows where a ﬂow is deﬁned as trafﬁc on a certain
5-tuple i.e. �ipsrc, portsrc, ipdst, portdst, protocol�. Furthermore, some
approaches consider bi-directional ﬂows in order to capture the dif-
ferences in incoming and outgoing trafﬁc [95]. DNS-based detection
approaches commonly target agile DNS i.e. IP-ﬂux and Domain-ﬂux
techniques. They do so by analyzing DNS trafﬁc from the perspec-
tive of DNS query responses (i.e. domain names and their resolving
IPs) [93, 99–101, 104], while some analyze it from the perspective of
domain clusters [102].
Trafﬁc instances are represented as sets of trafﬁc features in MLAs.
As already indicated, feature engineering is a challenging task as the
chosen feature representation should capture targeted characteristics of
malicious trafﬁc. The analyzed detection approaches greatly vary in
employed feature representation. The TCP/UDP based approaches use
features that are generally independent from the payload content, re-
lying on the information that can be gathered from packets headers as
well as different trafﬁc statistics. Several techniques [53, 92, 97, 106]
rely on the content of payloads thus being easily defeated by the en-
cryption or the obfuscation of the packet payload. Furthermore, some
approaches rely on IP addresses as features [94, 95] opening the possi-
bility of introducing bias in the evaluation of the detection performance.
In the case of the DNS analysis approaches typically rely on informa-
tion extracted from the DNS query responses, such as: lexical domain
name features, IP-based features, geo-location features, etc.
• What are the most common learning principles used by the existing
methods?
As illustrated by Table 7, the existing methods use a variety of machine
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Table 7: Contemporary machine learning-based botnet detection methods: trafﬁc analysis per-
spective and machine-learning algorithms
Detection Method
Analysis Supervised /
MLAs
Perspective Unsupervised
Masud et al. [53] Flow S
SVM, C4.5, Naive Bayes, Bayes Network,
and Boosted decision tree classiﬁers
Shin et al. [54] Flow S
Correlation of the ﬁndings of two MLAs:
SVM and One Class SVM (OCSVM)
Zeng et al. [55] Flow S,U
Correlation of the ﬁndings of two MLAs:
Hierarchical clustering and SVM
Livadas et al. [90] Flow S
C4.5 Tree, Naive Bayes
and Bayesian Network classiﬁers
Strayer et al. [91] Flow S
C4.5 Tree, Naive Bayes
and Bayesian Network classiﬁers
Gu et al. [92] Client U Two level clustering using X-means clustering
Choi et al. [93] DNS query/response U X-means clustering
Saad et al. [94] Flow S
SVM, ANN, Nearest Neighbours,
Gaussian and Naive Bayes classiﬁers
Zhao et al. [95] Flow S
Naive Bayes and
REPTree (Reduced Error Pruning) Decision Tree
Zhang et al. [96] Flow U
Two level clustering using
BIRCH algorithm and Hierarchical clustering
Lu et al. [97] Flow U
K-means, Un-merged X-means
and Merged X-means clustering
Bilge et al. [98] Flow S C4.5, SVM, and Random Forest classiﬁers
Bilge et al. [99] DNS query/response S C4.5 classiﬁer
Antonakakis et al. [100] DNS query/response S,U
X-Means clustering and
Decision Tree using Logit-Boost strategy (LAD)
Antonakakis et al. [101] DNS query/response S Random Forest classiﬁer
Perdisci et al. [102] Clusters of domain names S C4.5 classiﬁer
Tegeler et al. [103] Flow U CLUES (CLUstEring based on local Shrinking) algorithm
Zhao et al. [104] DNS query/response S REPTree (Reduced Error Pruning) Decision Tree
Zhang et al. [105] Flow U
Two level clustering using
K-means algorithm and Hierarchical clustering
Haddadi et al. [106] Flow S C4.5 classiﬁer
learning algorithms deployed in diverse setups. In total 15 different
MLAs were considered by the analyzed approaches. Supervised and
unsupervised MLAs are evenly represented in the analyzed methods.
Some of the authors experimented with more than one MLA provid-
ing the good insight on how the assumed trafﬁc representation holds
in different learning scenarios as well as what are the performance
of different MLAs [53, 90, 91, 94, 95, 97, 98]. Additionally, some au-
thors used MLAs in more advanced setups, where clustering of obser-
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vation is realized through two level clustering schemes [92, 96, 105]
or where the ﬁndings of independent MLAs were correlated in or-
der to pinpoint the malicious trafﬁc pattern [54, 55, 92, 100]. Fi-
nally, several authors used the same MLAs within their detection sys-
tems [53, 90, 91, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 102] providing us with the opportu-
nity to assess their capability of capturing network trafﬁc anomalies in
different commonly independent data sets.
• What MLAs are best suited for identifying malware network trafﬁc?
As already mentioned, a number of MLAs have been used in order to
develop the existing detection methods. Some of the most popular su-
pervised MLAs are Artiﬁcial Neural Networks, Tree Classiﬁers, Naive
Bayes Classiﬁer, Bayesian Network Classiﬁers, Nearest Neighbors Clas-
siﬁer and a number of ensemble classiﬁers. In parallel a number of
unsupervised approaches have been used where some of the most of-
ten used ones are K-means, X-means and Hierarchical clustering.
Based on the existing work, some of the best performing supervised
MLAs are decision tree classiﬁers including C4.5, Random Forests, REP-
Tree classiﬁers. The tree classiﬁers have shown to provide overall good
performance in both terms of accuracy of classiﬁcation as well as the
time needed to perform training and classiﬁcation tasks. The latter
should not be overlooked as having time-efﬁcient machine learning al-
gorithm is often one of the most important factors for operational im-
plementation. The most popular unsupervised MLAs are Hierarchical
clustering and X-means clustering. The reason for this is that these algo-
rithms do not need to be provided with a number of expected clusters
such in case of k-means clustering.
• How good are the performance of the existing machine learning-
based detection approaches?
The contemporary detection approaches have reported mostly afﬁrma-
tive detection performance that conﬁrm the potential of using MLAs for
the task of identifying malware related network activity. Several detec-
tion methods indicate TPR of 100% and overall low FPR [96, 104, 105].
Furthermore, a number of approaches is characterized with a FPR less
than 1%. These results indicate the possibility of using some of the
approaches in real-world operational networks.
However, when assessing performance of detection methods, it is cru-
cial to understand the used evaluation procedure. The existing meth-
ods are commonly evaluated using malicious and benign trafﬁc traces
recorded at different networks and at different times and contributed
by diverse types and number of malware samples as well as trafﬁc from
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diverse types of benign applications. As a result, contemporary meth-
ods cannot be directly compared based on the reported performance
alone.
In Paper II we have compared a number of approaches based on the
evaluation procedure used and the reported performance of detecting
malicious trafﬁc. The evaluation indicates several things. First, be-
nign trafﬁc is obtained at the point in the network corresponding to
the monitoring point the methods are developed for, most commonly
on campus or LAN networks with relatively limited number of client
machines. Second, the malicious trafﬁc samples are usually recorded
for a limited number of malware samples. For instance, the perfor-
mance of only ﬁve detection approaches were evaluated on the trafﬁc
traces produced by more than 5 malware samples [54, 55, 92, 103, 106],
while the maximal number of samples used for evaluation was 188 in
case of [103]. The rest of the methods were tested with less than 4 bot
malware samples. Finally, the diversity of the used malware samples
is poor as the majority of the analyzed approaches rely on less than 3
distinct families of botnets.
• What are the main challenges and pitfalls of using MLA for identify-
ing malware network activity?
Some of the biggest challenges of using MLA for identifying malware
network activity are evaluation challenge and the high cost of errors.
The evaluation challenge characterizes all data-driven approaches and
is related to the challenges of obtaining training and testing data [107].
The high cost of errors can be attributed to the network security appli-
cation domain where misidentiﬁed events can have signiﬁcant conse-
quence on security and integrity of safety critical system [84].
Evaluation challenges
The evaluation challenges can be differentiated into two problems i.e.
obtaining the evaluation data and the ground truth problem. As already
indicated, the existing detection methods are developed and evaluated
using various data sets of malicious and benign trafﬁc. The used data
sets are often sparse consisting of only a handful of botnet traces that
are obtained in a nontransparent way. Furthermore, the approaches
often rely on data sets that are artiﬁcially formed by overlaying and
merging data sets recorded at different monitoring points in network.
Obtaining the “quality” data for evaluation of the proposed machine
learning-based detection approach is crucial to reliable evaluation. Un-
der quality we mean a substantial amount of data that successfully cap-
tures both malicious and benign trafﬁc characteristics. Obtaining the
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high volume of trafﬁc traces is usually not the main problem as there is
an abundance of network trafﬁc that can be recorded at diverse points
in network. Depending on the principles of trafﬁc analysis used by the
proposed detection system trafﬁc can be recorded in different parts of
network from local level to higher network tiers. However, once the
trafﬁc is obtained the “true” nature of the trafﬁc should be determined
which is usually referred to as the ground truth problem.
As MLAs are data-driven methods (either supervised and unsuper-
vised), they are dependent on the accuracy of the data set used for their
development, optimization and evaluation. In case of supervised learn-
ing inaccuracy in the ground truth will consequently lead to inaccuracy
in the results of classiﬁcation performed by the learning technique. Fur-
thermore, the ground truth also has a relevant role in the context of
unsupervised learning, for what concerns performance evaluation.
High cost of errors
In contrast to some other MLA application domains, malware detec-
tion is more sensitive to detection errors. Generally, malware detection
is affected by the false negatives as failing to identiﬁed a threat could
potentially lead to the loss of sensitive information or compromising of-
ten safety critical systems. False alarms on the other hand, as in case of
many other anomaly detection systems, directly affect the operational
usability of the detection approaches. In case that a detection system
is producing too much false alarms the operator and end-users would
be burdened by it and consequently forced to ignore the detection in-
dications altogether. This should be taken in consideration as many
existing detection approaches report on paper good result with false
positive rates less than 5% [54, 94, 95, 108]. However, many fail to men-
tion the fact that such systems when faced with high number of testing
samples would result in a high number of false positives. As an ex-
ample, detection approaches are typically used for ﬂow classiﬁcation
where on enterprise networks these systems would easily be able to ob-
serve more than 1 million ﬂows per day. If a detection system has false
positive rate of 1% this corresponds to 10000 false positives which is in
any regards too much. Such a high number of false positives would
deem any detection system unusable in operational environment.
• How is the “ground truth” problem solved by the existing work?
One of the biggest challenges of using machine learning-based ap-
proaches is the lack of the ground truth on malicious and benign net-
work trafﬁc. The existing methods solve this problem by relying on
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honeypots and malware testing environments for obtaining the mali-
cious network trafﬁc or by relying on FQDNs and IPs blacklists and
whitelisting of popular domains for the labeling of pre-recorded traf-
ﬁc as malicious or benign. The use of domain and IPs blacklists has
been one of the most criticized but yet widely used labeling prac-
tice [93, 99–102, 109]. Many authors have indicated the drawbacks
of such labeling approaches indicating that blindly relying on them
could lead to wrong conclusions regarding malicious and benign net-
work trafﬁc [110–113]. Other authors rely on Honeypots and malware
testing environments for obtaining the malicious trafﬁc traces that are
then usually merged with the benign trafﬁc recorded at an equivalent
point in network. Finally, some authors combine the aforementioned
practices with manual validation by the network operator [102]. Al-
though tedious this practice often is able to eliminate the majority of
wrongly labeled network trafﬁc instances.
• What is the state of the operational deployment of these methods?
Existing have shown promising performance within experimental envi-
ronments but many of them have difﬁculties bridging the gap between
experimental and operational deployment. Some of the reasons for this
are elaborated by Sommer et al. [84] and Aviv et al. [107] and include
the cost of errors and the lack of quality data sets used for the develop-
ment and the evaluation of detection approaches.
However, it should be noted that some companies have developed
effective detection approaches that are directly based on the scien-
tiﬁc ﬁndings in regards to machine-learning botnet detection such as
Damballa [114] that has successfully deployed concepts of DNS-based
detection presented by Antonakakis et al. [100, 101, 115] in real-world
detection solutions. Furthermore, some MLAs have found an efﬁcient
use suitable for operational network such as Naive Bayes classiﬁer for
the classiﬁcation of SPAM messages and similar. The positive example
of the use of MLA in real-world detection solutions indicates the great
potential of this class of anomaly detection methods.
4.5 Opportunities for future work
As indicated by the presented state of the art, botnets and malware network
activity can be effectively and efﬁciently identiﬁed using network trafﬁc anal-
ysis. The existing collaborative detection methods indicate the opportunities
of utilizing diverse sources of information regarding malicious network ac-
tivity to achieve more accurate detection. In addition, the machine learning-
based approaches have proved to be able to facilitate accurate detection in
operational real-world solutions.
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The opportunities for future work are numerous. First, the collaborative
detection it is still in its early days and there is a signiﬁcant space for the
development of novel collaborative detection solutions. The novel solutions
should operate across different networks in order to encompass commonly
geographically disperse compromised clients and thus get a more compre-
hensive overview of botnet operation. These solutions should rely on both the
client-based and the network-based detection where the network-based de-
tection should be implemented in different points of the network from local to
backbone networks targeting different aspects of malicious trafﬁc. The novel
collaborative solutions should also rely on conventional AV providers in or-
der to facilitate prompt update of knowledge about client- and network-level
malware behavior. Finally, the novel solutions should facilitate secure and
trustworthy exchange of malware related information and generated alerts.
Second, the future network-based detection methods should rely MLAs as
prominent class of anomaly detection methods. These methods should rely
on the principles of network trafﬁc analysis that would successfully encom-
pass targeted botnet network characteristics and would carry the context that
is understandable to the operator of the system. Furthermore, one of the
important goals of future detection systems is to provide detection in less
time and expense comparing to the existing solutions. The novel detection
approaches should provide accurate detection in real-time thus facilitating
both effective and timely detection. The future methods should be evaluated
using an extensive set of network traces originating from diverse malware
families and types. Finally, special attention should be placed on minimizing
the number of errors in identifying malicious network trafﬁc so the proposed
methods would performance-wise be suitable for being used in operational
networks.
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5 Main Contributions
This section outlines main contributions of the thesis by outlining contribu-
tions of work presented in the attached papers. Each paper is presented,
addressing its position in the thesis as well as its contributions and limita-
tions.
5.1 An overview of thesis contributions
In this section we summarize the scientiﬁc contributions of 6 appended re-
search papers.
Paper I A collaborative approach to botnet protection.
This paper proposes a novel collaborative approach to botnet pro-
tection that integrates ﬁndings of diverse botnet detection solutions
in order to achieve effective detection and mitigation of botnets.
Paper II On the use of machine learning for identifying botnet network
trafﬁc.
This paper provides a comparative analysis of the existing methods
that rely on MLA for identifying botnet network trafﬁc. The paper
analyzes the characteristics, the capabilities and the challenges of
this class of detection methods.
Paper III On the ground truth problem of malicious DNS trafﬁc analysis.
This paper addresses the “ground truth” problem as one of the
fundamental challenges of machine learning-based detection. The
paper addresses the case study of agile DNS by proposing a novel
approach for obtaining the ground truth on malicious and benign
agile DNS trafﬁc.
Paper IV An efﬁcient ﬂow-based botnet detection using supervised ma-
chine learning.
This paper proposes a novel approach for identifying botnet trafﬁc
at local and enterprise networks based on network trafﬁc classiﬁ-
cation. The paper explores if detection can be achieved in less time
and expense in comparison to the existing work.
Paper V An analysis of network trafﬁc classiﬁcation for botnet detection.
This paper proposes three novel network trafﬁc classiﬁcation ap-
proaches for identifying botnet network activity at local and enter-
prise networks. The paper evaluates the capabilities of the three
approaches to obtain accurate and timely detection.
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Paper VI A method for identifying compromised clients based on DNS
trafﬁc analysis.
This paper proposes a novel method for identifying potentially
compromised clients based on DNS trafﬁc analysis at large-scale
ISP networks. The approach identiﬁes malicious agile domains-to-
IPs mappings and tracks potentially compromised clients that have
contributed to them.
The contributions of the thesis can be differentiated into four categories
in accordance to the four research questions addressed by the thesis. More
detailed summary of the attached papers and their contributions is presented
in the following.
5.2 Collaborative approach to botnet detection
The ﬁrst group of contributions is related to the development of a novel col-
laborative botnet detection approach with the goal of achieving effective and
efﬁcient detection of botnets. These contributions are covered by Paper I.
Paper I - A collaborative approach to botnet protection
Motivation - Modern malware and botnets as their latest incarnation rep-
resent complex phenomena that can be addressed using different de-
tection solutions. As illustrated on the ZeroAccess botnet case study
presented in Section 1, modern malware can be tackled based on both
client-level and network-level information while network-based detec-
tion solutions can be implemented in different parts of the network
and based on diverse trafﬁc analysis principles. Various detection ap-
proaches have different often non-overlapping scope thus various de-
tection capabilities and vulnerabilities to evasion techniques. This indi-
cates the possibility of correlating ﬁndings from independent detection
entities in order to achieve effective detection with wider scope and
higher resilience to evasion techniques.
Research Question - How can a collaborative botnet detection be realized in
order to achieve efﬁcient and effective detection?
Paper Summary - Paper I presents ContraBot framework, a novel system-
atic approach to the detection and mitigation of botnets. ContraBot be-
longs to the emerging class of collaborative botnet detection approaches
that integrate diverse principles of botnet detection, in order to pro-
vide more efﬁcient and effective detection. The ContraBot framework
consists of a number of network trafﬁc pre-analysis and client activ-
ity pre-analysis entities that target botnets on network- and client-level,
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respectively. Network trafﬁc pre-analysis entities represent a set of net-
work sniffers placed within the network to collect and pre-process net-
work trafﬁc data, while client activity pre-analysis entities represent a
set of activity monitors within the clients that collect and pre-process
information about client activity. The output of this pre-processing is
passed to a set of one or more correlators, where it is analyzed to reveal
patterns of similar behavior in different clients and different parts of
the network. Unusual patterns of activity, will lead to the harvesting
of portions of code from the clients and the associated network traf-
ﬁc, so that these can be further analyzed by entities which investigate
the code for malicious elements. In addition, the framework includes
client distribution analysis entities that analyze modules, applications
and other forms of software fetched by the clients from the network so
that well-known malicious software can be disabled or removed as in a
conventional AV system. As the ContraBot framework includes input
from a wide range of sources, including sensors installed by end users,
ISPs and backbone network providers it is important that all parties
can evaluate the trustworthiness of the input they receive. The correla-
tion framework will therefore include a trust management component
that aims to establish the trustworthiness of input based on both direct
experiences with the individual input provider and reputation ratings
exchanged between the different correlators in the correlation frame-
work. If the correlators, distribution analysis entities or code analysis
entities detect signs of malicious software, they pass this information to
a sub-system which generates warnings for distribution to subscribers
of the anti-botnet service. This allows the subscribers to initiate various
counter measures, such as walled-garden, disinfection, etc.
Scientiﬁc Contribution - The main contribution of the paper is a novel
framework for botnet protection that combines existing detection ef-
forts into a collaborative botnet protection framework.
Related Work - To the best of our knowledge the ContraBot framework
could possibly be the ﬁrst extensive attempt to take counter botnet re-
search to a systematic level, providing the basis for a more compre-
hensive botnet defense system. The proposed framework builds on the
same principles as several existing approaches [55, 57–59] but also has
a number of advantages comparing to them. First, the ContraBot will
employ trafﬁc analysis in the core network, providing protection for a
broader set of end-users. Secondly, the proposed set-up will combine
information not only from network and client levels but also from in
depth analysis of harvested code in order to improve the detection accu-
racy even further. Third, the proposed system will provide the ﬂexibil-
ity of including diverse end-user platforms through the development of
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appropriate client-based analysis entities. Fourth, our system will also
introduce the feed-back mechanism. This will provide the adaptability
of network- and client-based pre-analysis entities to the bot-related in-
formation generated by correlating ﬁndings from other sources. This
information allows the system to dynamically adapt to changes in the
behavior of bots and botnets.
5.3 Machine learning for network-based botnet detection
The second group of contributions is related to evaluating the use of MLAs
for identifying malware network activities and addressing some of the main
challenges of this class of detection methods. These contributions are covered
by Paper II and Paper III.
Paper II - On the use of machine learning for identifying botnet network
trafﬁc
Motivation - A number of detection methods based on MLAs have been pro-
posed over the last decade. These methods rely on diverse MLAs, they
employ different principle of network trafﬁc analysis, they are eval-
uated using a range of network trafﬁc traces and consequently they
provide varying detection performance. As a result, there is a need
for providing a comprehensive overview of existing scientiﬁc efforts,
outlining their capabilities and challenges.
Research Question - What are the capabilities and limitations of the existing
machine-learning based approaches?
Paper Summary - Paper II presents a survey on the use of machine learning
for network-based botnet detection. The paper evaluates 20 prominent
contemporary detection approaches by analyzing their characteristics,
capabilities and limitations. The paper analyzes the characteristics of
existing methods by analyzing the principles of trafﬁc analysis, MLAs
and feature representation used by the approaches. Furthermore, the
capabilities of the approaches are analyzed by comparing methodolo-
gies used for performance evaluation as well as by analyzing the re-
ported performance. The paper also evaluates the vulnerability of ex-
isting detection methods to a series of evasion techniques. Finally, the
paper outlines the best practices and opportunities for future work.
Scientiﬁc Contribution - The main contribution of the paper is a compre-
hensive insight into the characteristics, the capabilities and the chal-
lenges of existing detection methods.
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Results and Conclusions - The paper indicates that existing detection meth-
ods based on MLA show a great perspective for being used for iden-
tifying botnets i.e. malware network activity. The existing methods
target trafﬁc at different points in network where the majority of the
approaches target botnets at local and campus network. Overall the
methods mostly target C&C trafﬁc by targeting TCP, UDP and DNS
protocols as the main carriers of botnet activity. The trafﬁc is commonly
analyzed from the perspective of transport layer ﬂows and DNS query
responses. Furthermore, the study indicates that some of the most pop-
ular MLAs are decision tree classiﬁers (C4.5, Random Forests, REPTree)
for classiﬁcation and Hierarchical clustering and X-means clustering for
grouping trafﬁc observations.
The proposed methods have been evaluated using diverse evaluation
schemes and malicious network trafﬁc obtained in different scenarios
that commonly include running malware binaries. However, the ma-
jority of existing method have been evaluated with trafﬁc traces from
a limited set of malware samples/families, thus requiring a more thor-
ough evaluation. The reported detection performance varies where a
few methods achieve performance characterized with high true pos-
itive rate and low false positive rates. Finally, real-time operation is
promised by a handful of the approaches opening the space for further
improvements.
Related Work - To the best of our knowledge this paper presents one of the
ﬁrst and the most comprehensive overviews of the machine-learning
based detection methods. Garcia et al. [116] and Karim et al. [56] have
also provided comprehensive surveys on existing network-based botnet
detection approaches indicating the crucial place of approaches that
use MLAs for identifying botnet network activity. However, Garcia et
al. compared 8 detection methods based on MLAs, while Karim et al.
analyzed only 3 approaches thus covering only a sub-set of the research
area.
Paper III - On the ground truth problem of malicious DNS trafﬁc analysis
Motivation - One of the main challenges of machine learning-based detec-
tion methods is the lack of the “ground truth” on the malicious and
benign network trafﬁc that is needed in order to evaluate the pro-
posed methods and train methods based on supervised MLAs. Detec-
tion methods that target agile malicious DNS trafﬁc i.e. Fast-ﬂux and
Domain-ﬂux often have MLAs at their core and therefore suffer from
the same problem. The existing methods commonly rely on conven-
tional methods for obtaining the ground truth such as domain and IP
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address blacklists and the whitelisting of popular domains. Blacklists
are often formed in non-transparent way and based on different crite-
ria regarding what constitutes malicious domains and IP addresses, so
relying on them can lead to sub-optimal and unreliable labeling. Fur-
thermore, whitelisting popular domains can lead to the exclusion of
malicious popular domains. All of this indicates the need for a novel
approach for labeling agile DNS trafﬁc.
Research Question - How can reliable and time-efﬁcient labeling of agile
DNS trafﬁc be achieved?
Paper Summary - Paper III elaborates the ground truth problem on the use
case of agile DNS trafﬁc. The paper gives a critical overview of the
DNS labeling approaches used by contemporary DNS-based detection
approaches, that are often solely based on 3rd party domain and IP
blacklists. The paper also introduces a novel semi-manual labeling ap-
proach that has a goal of providing reliable and time-efﬁcient labeling
of agile DNS trafﬁc by incorporating operator’s insight in efﬁcient man-
ner. The labeling method analyzes DNS trafﬁc from the perspective of
domains-to-IPs mappings. We rely on DNSMap [42] for extracting ag-
ile mappings from the recorded DNS trafﬁc. The agile domains-to-IPs
mappings are analyzed as bipartite graphs where for each of them a set
of distinguishable features is extracted. The used perspective of trafﬁc
analysis is suitable for manual analysis as it groups the vast amount of
DNS trafﬁc to a number of mappings suitable for manual evaluation.
The proposed labeling method combines an automated approach for
labeling agile DNS trafﬁc based on a set of analysis with a manual
validation step. The automated approach covers 6 following analysis
entities analyzing different characteristics of domains-to-IPs mappings:
the graph analysis, the analysis of domain names, the analysis of IP ad-
dresses, the analysis of blacklisted domains, the analysis of blacklisted
IP addresses and the analysis of whitelisted domains. The analysis
entities extract a set of distinguishable features that are used in order
to represent the domains-to-IPs mappings within clustering algorithm.
The clustering algorithm pre-labels extracted mappings as malicious
and benign and presents them to the operator for validation.
The proposed semi-manual labeling approach is evaluated using an ex-
tensive set of DNS trafﬁc traces from a regional ISP. Comparison of the
proposed labeling approach to conventional approaches indicates that
the proposed approach is able to discover a much wider set of malicious
agile domain-to-IPs mappings than conventional methods. Finally, the
approach has proved to be time-efﬁcient by incorporating operator’s
insight in an efﬁcient manner.
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Scientiﬁc Contribution - The main contribution of the paper is a novel
method for obtaining the ground truth on malicious agile DNS trafﬁc
that incorporates operator’s insight in time-efﬁcient manner.
Results and Conclusions - The proposed labeling approach is evaluated us-
ing DNS trafﬁc traces from a regional ISP. The labeling results are com-
pared with existing labeling practices that predominantly rely on 3rd
party domain and IP address blacklists. The experimental results con-
ﬁrm the importance of domain and IP address blacklists as well as
domain whitelisting for labeling of DNS trafﬁc but also indicate that
the blind reliance on them may lead to misleading conclusions about
analyzed DNS trafﬁc. Comparing the proposed semi-manual labeling
approach with automated labeling approaches that rely on domain/IP
blacklists and domain whitelisting, the proposed approach has shown
better coverage as it discovers suspicious domains/IP addresses based
on their association with other rogue domains/IP addresses. Further-
more, the automated solutions lead to a number of false positives, re-
quiring human insight in order to safeguard against them. Finally, the
proposed labeling approach has proved to incorporate operator’s in-
sight in efﬁcient manner requiring between 4-6 man-hours for evalu-
ating labels for a week long network trace. The reported performance
makes the proposed labeling approach a viable candidate for deploy-
ment within operational ISP networks.
Related Work - The majority of existing methods for identifying malicious
DNS trafﬁc [93, 99–102] rely on domain and IP address blacklists and
whitelisting of popular domain for labeling DNS trafﬁc. To the best
of our knowledge the proposed method is one of the ﬁrst to introduce
an approach for labeling agile DNS trafﬁc that incorporates operator in
time-efﬁcient manner.
5.4 Detection of malicious network activities at enterprise
networks
The third group of contributions is related to the development of novel detec-
tion methods for identifying botnets at local and enterprise networks based
on network trafﬁc classiﬁcation. These contributions are covered by Paper IV
and Paper V.
Paper IV - An efﬁcient ﬂow-based botnet detection using supervised ma-
chine learning
Motivation - Existing methods rely on a number of different supervised
MLAs for identifying botnet network activities. Furthermore, several
48
5. Main Contributions
approaches rely on ﬂow-level trafﬁc analysis. This indicates the need
for a thorough evaluation of the capabilities of the ﬂow-level analysis
and supervised MLAs to facilitate accurate and time-efﬁcient identiﬁ-
cation of botnet network trafﬁc.
Research Questions - Can the ﬂow-level analysis and the supervised MLAs
facilitate detection of botnet network trafﬁc in less time and expense in
comparison to the contemporary approaches? What supervised MLA
shows the best performance in classifying botnet network trafﬁc? What
is the minimal amount of trafﬁc per ﬂow that needs to be considered in
order to perform accurate detection?
Paper Summary - Paper IV proposes a novel botnet detection approach that
analyzes network trafﬁc from the perspective of trafﬁc ﬂows. The pro-
posed method is capable of targeting botnets at local and enterprise
networks by covering all phases of botnet operation and identifying
botnet trafﬁc regardless of the underlying C&C communication proto-
col and botnet topology. The proposed approach relies on ﬂow-level
analysis, where we deﬁne ﬂows such that they encompass bidirectional
communication via TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols. Furthermore, the
paper evaluated eight different supervised MLAs thus representing one
of the most comprehensive studies of the use of different supervised
MLAs for the task of botnet trafﬁc classiﬁcation. The paper also ana-
lyzes how much trafﬁc need to be analyzed per ﬂow so botnet trafﬁc
could be accurately detected. The results of the evaluation indicate the
possibilities of detecting malicious network trafﬁc using only 10 packets
per ﬂow while monitoring ﬂows for only a period of 60 seconds. The
achieved accuracy of trafﬁc classiﬁcation is in line with results reported
by the existing work. However, it should be noted that the proposed
approach achieved it for a limited amount of trafﬁc analyzed per ﬂow.
Scientiﬁc Contribution - The main contribution of the paper is a novel de-
tection approach that evaluates the performance of identifying botnet
network activity at local and enterprise networks using the ﬂow-level
analysis and an array of MLAs.
Results and Conclusions - The proposed detection approach is evaluated
using botnet trafﬁc traces captured by honeypots and non-malicious
trafﬁc originating from diverse benign applications. For the evaluation
we use the same data set as Saad et al. [94] approach thus a suitable
comparison is possible. The proposed detection system has proved to
be accurate in detecting botnet trafﬁc using simple ﬂow-level feature
representation and Random Tree classiﬁer. Additionally, the experi-
ments showed that in order to provide a high accuracy of detection the
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trafﬁc ﬂows need to be monitored for only a limited duration of time
and a limited number of packets per ﬂow. The obtained classiﬁcation
results are comparable with ones reported by Saad et al. but with the
note that our approach used limited amount of trafﬁc per ﬂow and
was able to obtain accurate results for only 10 packets per ﬂow and 60
seconds of ﬂow monitoring time. The results indicate the possibilities
of using the presented approach in a more adaptive set-up that could
facilitate on-line detection.
Related Work - The proposed method draws from the experiences and
ﬁndings of several detection methods that rely on ﬂow-level analy-
sis [90, 94, 95]. Our solution covers all phases of botnet network ac-
tivity and it is independent from C&C protocol in contrast to some
existing approaches [90, 94]. Furthermore, as already indicated the pro-
posed method is able to provide comparable detection performance by
minimizing amount of trafﬁc analyzed per ﬂow. Finally, in contrast to
such as Saad et al. approach our detection method does not rely on IP
addresses or any other client identiﬁers as features thus avoiding the
possibility of over optimistic detection using biased data sets.
Paper V - An analysis of network trafﬁc classiﬁcation for botnet detection
Motivation - As concluded in Paper IV, promising detection performance of
botnet trafﬁc can be achieved using supervised MLAs. However, the
ﬂow-level analysis used in Paper IV has limitation in capturing more
detailed characteristics of trafﬁc such as the state of TCP connections,
DNS trafﬁc queries, etc. Therefore, in order to improve classiﬁcation
performance more advanced trafﬁc analysis is required. Furthermore,
detection methods should be evaluated with more extensive trafﬁc data
sets in order to obtain more reliable evaluation of the performance of
the method.
Research Question - Can accurate and time-efﬁcient classiﬁcation of botnet
TCP, UDP and DNS trafﬁc be realized using supervised MLAs?
Paper Summary - Paper V proposes three novel methods for network trafﬁc
classiﬁcation targeting three protocols often seen as the main carriers
of botnet network activity namely TCP, UDP and DNS. The proposed
classiﬁers are capable of being used for identifying botnet trafﬁc at local
and enterprise networks covering all phases of botnet network opera-
tion regardless of the underlying C&C communication protocol. The
three classiﬁers are developed using a capable Random Forests classi-
ﬁer. In contrast to Paper IV, the work presented in this paper brings
more advanced trafﬁc analysis by separating the analysis of TCP, UDP
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and DNS trafﬁc where TCP and UDP are analyzed from the perspec-
tive of bi-directional transport layer conversations while DNS is ana-
lyzed from the perspective of queries/responses for a particular do-
main name. Furthermore, the analysis is performed in time window
thus opening the possibility of applying the proposed detection method
in on-line fashion, where the trafﬁc classiﬁers would be periodically re-
trained. Trafﬁc instances extracted for the proposed classiﬁers rely on
novel feature representations that should better leverage the theoreti-
cal and practical knowledge about botnet trafﬁc anomalies. The de-
tection methods have been evaluated using one of the most extensive
botnet data sets. For the evaluation of classiﬁers, we considered dif-
ferent length of the analysis window and different number of packets
per TCP/UDP conversations. The results of evaluation indicate that all
three classiﬁers are able to achieve accurate classiﬁcation (accuracy >
98%) in reasonable classiﬁcation time.
Scientiﬁc Contribution - The main contribution of the paper is development
of three new classiﬁers that provide an overall improvement in classiﬁ-
cation performance in comparison to our previous work.
Results and Conclusions - The proposed method has been evaluated using
benign trafﬁc traces recorded at local/campus networks and malicious
trafﬁc traces obtained using Honeypots and malware testing environ-
ments. It should be noted that we evaluated the presented classiﬁers
using one of the most extensive set of botnet network traces to date.
The detection performance obtained with the proposed classiﬁcation
methods are on pair with some of the most prominent detection meth-
ods, with precision and recall over 0.98 for all three classiﬁers. However,
we believe that our approach has a slight advantage as the results were
obtained using one of the most extensive data sets.
Related Work - The three proposed classiﬁers provide signiﬁcant improve-
ments in the accuracy of botnet trafﬁc classiﬁcation comparing to the
classiﬁer presented in Paper IV. Furthermore, similarly to the work
presented in Paper IV the three classiﬁers have several advantages over
the existing approaches. First, our approach is evaluated with one of
the most extensive botnet data sets. Second, our solution covers all
phases of botnet network operation in contrast to some existing ap-
proaches [90, 94]. Third, our detection methods do not consider the use
of IP addresses or any other client identiﬁers as features in contrast to
the existing work [94, 95].
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5.5 Detection of malicious network activities in ISP networks
The forth group of contributions is related to the detection of malware net-
work activity in ISP networks. More precisely identifying potentially compro-
mised clients based on DNS trafﬁc analysis. These contributions are covered
by Paper VI.
Paper VI - A method for identifying compromised clients based on DNS
trafﬁc analysis
Motivation - DNS is often abused by cyber criminals in order to host ma-
licious services and facilitate the discovery of malicious network in-
frastructure. Furthermore, agile DNS strategies such as Fast-ﬂux and
Domain-ﬂux are often used by miscreants as they provide resilient re-
laying and reliable hosting. DNS trafﬁc analysis is suitable for the de-
ployment in ISP networks due to relatively small amount of DNS trafﬁc
in comparison to the total amount of network trafﬁc. All of this indi-
cates the possibility of using DNS trafﬁc analysis for identifying poten-
tially compromised clients in large-scale ISP network.
Research Question - How can an efﬁcient identiﬁcation of potentially com-
promised clients based on DNS trafﬁc be implemented in large-scale
ISP networks?
Paper Summary - Paper VI introduces a novel method for identifying poten-
tially compromised clients based on DNS trafﬁc analysis. The method
targets malicious agile DNS trafﬁc as the main carrier of illicit DNS
activity. The proposed method analyzes trafﬁc from the perspective
of domains-to-IPs mappings, as in the case of the labeling approach
proposed in Paper III. The extracted agile domains-to-IPs mappings
are classiﬁed as malicious or benign using a novel classiﬁer based on
Random Forests classiﬁer and a novel feature representation for agile
domain-to-IPs mappings. The identiﬁed malicious mappings are then
used to trace back to potentially compromised clients that have pro-
duced them. The proposed approach provides the operator with the
ability of analyzing the identiﬁed malicious domains-to-IPs mappings
and discovering clients that have queried domains within them. This
way the operator can pinpoint the malicious agile DNS trafﬁc of interest
and can discover clients that have contributed to it. The method was
evaluated using an extensive DNS trafﬁc traces recorded at diverse ISP
networks. The evaluation indicates a great potential of accurately iden-
tifying malicious agile domain-to-IPs mappings and clients that have
contributed to it.
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Scientiﬁc Contribution - The main contribution of this paper is a novel de-
tection method that discovers potentially compromised clients based on
DNS trafﬁc analysis in large-scale ISP networks.
Results and Conclusions - The novel DNS-based detection approach is eval-
uated using extensive trafﬁc traces from the networks of mobile and
ﬁber ISPs. The traces were recorded over the total period of 15 weeks
during the last 5 years. The obtained trafﬁc traces are labeled using the
semi-manual labeling approach proposed in Paper III. The evaluation
shows promising results in identifying malicious agile DNS mappings
and clients that have tried to resolve domains within them. The ac-
curacy of identifying agile malicious domain-to-IPs mappings is just
under 87% opening possibilities for future improvements.
Related Work - As in Paper III, the proposed method analyzes DNS traf-
ﬁc from the perspective of domains-to-IPs mappings as deﬁned by
DNSMap [42]. The analysis of domains-to-IPs mappings is recognized
as a valuable mean of identifying malicious agile DNS by other au-
thors such as Schiavoni et al. [117]. Although based on the similar DNS
analysis principles Schiavoni et al. approach is only able to identify
DGA based domains while our solution covers both Fast- and Domain-
ﬂux. Furthermore, the proposed method belongs to the small group of
DNS-based detection methods that identify potentially compromised
clients [93, 118, 119]. The main advantage of our approach comparing
to the existing work is the ability to target both Fast-ﬂux and Domain-
ﬂux and operate on large-scale ISP networks.
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6 Conclusions
This section outlines how the solutions presented in this thesis can contribute
to tackling the malware threat. The section also summarizes the main conclu-
sions for each of the research questions addressed by the thesis. Furthermore,
the section discusses the possibilities of applying the presented methods in
real-world operational networks. Finally, the section outlines the opportuni-
ties for future work.
The solutions presented in this thesis contribute to solving the malware
problem in the following ways. Paper I presents a collaborative framework
for botnet protection, that represents a comprehensive solution that envisions
the use of various detection and mitigation approaches in order to achieve
effective protection against botnets. The proposed solution could be imple-
mented at the network of one or multiple ISPs thus providing the protection
against botnets for all clients within the network. Paper II contributes to
solving the malware problem by clarifying the opportunities and challenges
of using MLAs for identifying botnet network trafﬁc through the analysis of
the existing work. Paper III solves the ground truth problem as one of the
biggest challenges of machine learning-based detection approaches on the
case study of agile DNS trafﬁc. The proposed solution provides the labeling
of data sets needed for the training and the evaluation of detection solutions
in reliable and time-efﬁcient manner. Paper IV, Paper V and Paper VI pro-
pose detection solutions that can be used in identifying malicious network
trafﬁc at different points in network and based on diverse trafﬁc analysis
principles. The solutions presented in Paper IV and Paper V can be used
for identifying botnet network trafﬁc at local and enterprise networks while
the solution presented in Paper VI can be used for identifying potentially
compromised clients in large-scale ISP networks. The solution presented in
Paper VI captures a wider subset of malicious trafﬁc by covering DNS trafﬁc
used by malware and botnets but also DNS trafﬁc used for facilitating scam
and spamming campaigns. As the proposed detection solutions target differ-
ent traits of malicious trafﬁc and as they are developed to monitor trafﬁc at
different points in network they could be used within a future collaborative
botnet protection approach that would be developed based on the principles
presented in Paper I.
6.1 Summary
Research question 1 - The ﬁrst research question highlights the need for
a collaborative multifaceted approach to botnet protection. We have ad-
dressed the research question by introducing ContraBot - a novel framework
for collaborative botnet protection in Paper I.
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Paper I stresses that complex threats such as modern malware manifest
them self in a number of forms and that there are various opportunities
for identifying existence of compromised computers. Furthermore, the pa-
per highlights the fact that there is no “silver bullet” in botnet detection and
that all detection approaches are vulnerable to evasion by the attacker to
smaller or larger degree. Therefore, the paper concludes that effective de-
tection should incorporate a number of available analysis solutions in order
to cover different aspects of botnet operation and thus limit the possibil-
ities of evading detection. The proposed system should include different
detection entities varying from network trafﬁc analysis, behavioral analysis
of malware to static code analysis.
Research question 2 - The second research question addresses the chal-
lenges of using machine learning-based approaches and the ways of over-
coming them. We addressed the research question by Paper II and Paper
III that have goals of putting more light on the use of MLAs in existing
detection methods and solving ground truth problem as one of the crucial
challenges of the use of MLAs.
Paper II brings a number of conclusions regarding the use of MLAs by the
existing detection methods. First, detection solutions should specially con-
sider analysis perspective so that the results of detection would provide the
operator with an insightful outlook in the state of the network, instead of
reporting a yet another alarm. Second, detection solutions should put em-
phasis on limiting detection errors and especially tackling the problem of
high number of false positives. Third, there is a need for more thorough
evaluation of existing detection methods using trafﬁc traces from more di-
verse malware samples and diverse benign applications as well as the need
for reliable methods and tools for obtaining the ground truth on malicious
and benign trafﬁc.
Paper III concludes that labeling used by existing DNS-based solutions often
produces sub-optimal results and that there is a clear need for more reliable
approach for obtaining the ground truth on agile DNS trafﬁc. Furthermore,
the used domain-to-IPs analysis perspective contributes to the better under-
standing of the nature of analyzed DNS trafﬁc and the discovery of a wider
set of potentially malicious domains-to-IPs mappings. Finally, the paper
concludes that human insight is invaluable for obtaining reliable ground
truth and that one of the goals of novel labeling approaches should be in-
cluding the human insight in time-efﬁcient manner.
Research question 3 - The third research question tackles the problem of
identifying botnets at local and enterprise networks using the principle of
network trafﬁc classiﬁcation. We have proposed novel approaches for identi-
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fying botnet network activity based on network trafﬁc classiﬁcation in Paper
IV and Paper V.
Paper IV evaluates the use of eight supervised MLAs and the ﬂow-based
trafﬁc analysis for the identiﬁcation of botnet trafﬁc at local and enterprise
networks. The paper concludes that the employed principles of trafﬁc anal-
ysis can provide classiﬁcation performance in line with the contemporary
approaches but with limited amount of trafﬁc analyzed per ﬂow. Further-
more, the paper concludes that the optimal detection performance and time
requirements of classiﬁcation can be achieved using tree based classiﬁers.
Paper V evaluated three trafﬁc classiﬁers targeted at identifying botnet TCP,
UDP and DNS trafﬁc. We evaluated the three classiﬁers with some of the
most extensive botnet data sets achieving promising classiﬁcation results.
The main conclusion of the paper is that by using separate classiﬁers for the
three protocols it is possible to obtain more ﬁne grained classiﬁcation that
consequently leads to more accurate classiﬁcation in comparison to work
presented in Paper IV.
Research question 4 - The fourth research question tackles the problem of
detecting malicious network activity in ISP networks. We address this re-
search question by introducing a novel method for identifying potentially
compromised clients based on DNS trafﬁc analysis at large-scale ISP net-
work. The method is presented in Paper VI.
Paper VI concludes on several points. First, the paper concludes on the great
beneﬁt of domains-to-IPs analysis perspective that offers both better contex-
tualization of the detection results and the possibility for network operator
to manually analyze detection results and correct any errors that may have
occurred. Second, the paper concludes on the promising ability of the pro-
posed domains-to-IPs mappings classiﬁer to accurately identify malicious
mappings. Third, the paper concludes on the possibilities of efﬁciently pin-
pointing the potentially compromised clients based on particular malicious
domains-to-IPs mappings whose domain names clients resolved.
6.2 Discussion
The methods presented in this thesis have promising perspectives of being
implemented in operational networks. However, the methods also come with
challenges that need to be thoroughly understood in order for methods to be
effectively used.
The novel DNS trafﬁc labeling approach proposed by Paper III is devel-
oped considering the use in operational networks. The approach relies on
domains-to-IPs mappings perceptive that is suitable for analysis by a human
operator as it yields a reasonable number of mappings when analyzing DNS
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trafﬁc from an ISP network. The approach incorporates operator’s insight in
the labeling process in time-efﬁcient manner which makes it a great tool for
security practitioners that aim at obtaining reliable ground truth on analyzed
DNS trafﬁc. Finally, the method has been evaluated using network trace from
a regional ISP operator and based on the analysis the labeling approach could
be scaled to network several times bigger still keeping the operator’s insight
at a reasonable scale.
Network trafﬁc classiﬁers presented by Paper IV and Paper V show en-
couraging perspectives in being used for botnet detection at local and en-
terprise networks. The performance of the proposed approaches in terms
of computational requirements and time-efﬁciency indicate the possibilities
of using the proposed concepts for real-time detection at trafﬁc load that
could be expected at enterprise networks using even of-the-shelf computers.
Classiﬁcation performance are also promising but still require further im-
provements in order for the classiﬁers to be effectively used in operational
environment. For classiﬁcation methods presented in Paper V the number of
false positives averages at 1-2% which is on pair with existing work. However,
this needs to be addressed aiming at zero false positives before the classiﬁers
could be moved into operational environments.
Finally, detection approach proposed by Paper VI is based on the similar
principles of trafﬁc analysis as labeling approach presented in Paper III and
thus was developed with the operational use in mind. The performance
of the systems is suitable for carrying out per-week analysis of ISP network
trafﬁc and extracting a set of client machines (Internet endpoints) from which
problematic domains have been queried. The performance of the system was
evaluated using an off-the-shelf computer indicating possibilities for further
performance improvements. Regarding the identiﬁcation performance, the
detection system still has a noticeable number of falsely identiﬁed domains-
to-IPs mappings that need to be further minimized in order to use the full
potential of the system. However, even if the proposed system produces false
positives due to the nature of the used analysis perspective and the relatively
low number of agile mappings these errors could be noticed and eliminated
by the operator of the system.
6.3 Future Work
The future work will be devoted to several tracks. First, one of the primary
goals should be bringing to life the collaborative detection frameworks pre-
sented in Paper I. The collaborative approach could be based on the solutions
for detecting botnets at enterprise and ISP networks proposed by Paper IV,
Paper V and Paper VI, as well as additional client-based detection solutions.
For the realization of the client-based detection solution we can rely on some
of our work on identifying malware types and families [120, 121] based on
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client-level behavioral analysis. However, such a collaborative system would
require a wide coalition of ISPs, AV vendors and end users in order to fulﬁll
its potentials. This could potentially be done through future nationwide or
EU projects. Second, the detection approaches proposed in papers Paper IV,
Paper V and Paper VI should be further developed in order to provide more
precise detection. This could be done by optimizing the principles of network
trafﬁc analysis through feature engineering and optimization of used MLAs.
Furthermore, as these methods rely on supervised MLAs that is dependent
on the training data sets additional trafﬁc traces should be used for training
the classiﬁers. This is especially important for the approach presented in Pa-
per VI as we attribute the majority of falsely classiﬁed instances to the lack
of training data. Third, the labeling approach proposed in Paper III should
be further improved by optimizing the trafﬁc analysis used by it in order to
further minimize human involvement in the process of DNS trafﬁc labeling.
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This thesis explores how can network traffic analysis be used for accurate 
and efficient detection of malware network activities. The thesis focuses on 
botnet detection by devising novel detection approaches that are aimed at 
identifying malware network activity at different points in the network and 
based on different, mutually complementary, principles of traffic analysis. 
The proposed approaches rely on machine learning algorithms (MLAs) for 
automated and resource-efficient identification of the patterns of malicious 
network traffic. We evaluated the proposed methods through extensive eval-
uations using traffic traces from honeypots and malware testing environ-
ments as well as operational ISP networks. Based on the evaluation, the novel 
detection methods provide accurate and efficient identification of malicious 
network traffic, thus being promising in the light of operational deployment. 
Furthermore, the thesis provides an overview of some of the biggest chal-
lenges of using MLAs for identifying malicious network activities. The chal-
lenge specially addressed by the thesis is the “ground truth” problem, where 
we proposed a novel labeling approach for obtaining the ground truth on 
agile DNS traffic that provides reliable and time-efficient labeling. Finally, 
the thesis outlines the opportunities for future work on realizing robust and 
effective detection solutions.
